

**RESEARCH PAPER****A Historical Analysis of the Socio-Economic Implications of Afghan Refugees for Pakistan**

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ABSTRACT

Numerous studies highlight the economic cost and security risk posed by Afghan refugees in Pakistan. On the other hand, little research has been done to determine if they pose a threat or an opportunity. It's crucial to understand that, despite the perception that they pose a threat, migrants can also offer economic and political opportunities as well as they have a constructive influence on social structures. In order to fully represent the lived experiences, viewpoints, and narratives of those impacted by the problem, qualitative methodologies are essential. Qualitative research can provide insight into the social and cultural dynamics of refugee integration, community attitudes, the difficulties Afghan refugees encounter in accessing services, and the efficacy of governmental policies and humanitarian interventions in the context of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The majority of papers focus on the issues that refugees bring to their new country, while governments hardly draw attention to the advantages that refugees could have for their own citizens or the global community. This research paper examines the potential and risks that Afghan refugees in Pakistan present. It tackles with the construct of the psychological approach of the natives to perceive the refugees as a threat for their economy as well as responsible for all social evils prevalent in their society. It finds that lack of solid governmental policies and actions created problems in terms of the socio-political assimilation of the refugees. The study recommends that legal framework for handling this segment of the populace must be revised rationally by the federal government.

KEYWORDS Afghan Refugees, Implications, Pakistan, Socio-Economic Development

Introduction

One of the longest-lasting and most complicated refugee crises in recent history is the result of the continuous conflict and political unrest in Afghanistan. Millions of Afghans have fled to neighboring nations since the late 20th century, mostly to Pakistan and Iran. The labor markets, public services, and general economic environment have all been significantly impacted by these migrations in both of the host countries. There are multiple significant events that preceded the migration of Afghan refugees. Large-scale displacement began with the Soviet Union's takeover of Afghanistan in 1979; by the mid-1980s, an estimated 5 million Afghans had fled to Pakistan and Iran. Instead of bringing calm, the 1989 withdrawal of Soviet forces sparked a civil conflict that forced more people from Afghanistan.

More refugees left during the Taliban rule (1996–2001) as a result of egregious violations of human rights and harsh socioeconomic policies. Some of the refugees from the U.S.-led war of 2001, which was intended to destroy Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, originally returned. New waves of displacement have been brought about, meanwhile, by the continued insurgency and the Taliban's subsequent rebirth. Afghans have been displaced for a very long time; as of 2021, the UNHCR stated that over 2.2 million registered refugees from Afghanistan were still living in Pakistan and Iran. In the past, Pakistan has accommodated the greatest number of Afghan refugees. Roughly 3.3 million Afghans had entered Pakistan by 1980. Primarily in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, the government created refugee camps, which subsequently transformed into semi-permanent settlements. The number of refugees fluctuated in the 1990s as a result of continued violence and repatriation schemes. Afghan refugees in Pakistan endure several difficulties in spite of foreign aid. Many have no official legal status, which makes it harder for them to get jobs and use government services. On the other hand, Afghan refugees have also contributed significantly to the economy, especially in the unofficial labor market where they have filled critical positions in small companies, agriculture, and construction.

In the same way, Iran has taken in a sizable number of Afghan refugees – roughly 2.5 million at its highest point in the 1990s. Over the years, Iranian policy on Afghan refugees has changed, going from offering them temporary safety and allowing them to work in the country to imposing restrictions on their freedom of movement and employment and even forcing them to return home. Despite these obstacles, a large number of Afghan refugees in Iran incorporated themselves into the community's economy by working in industries including services, development, and agriculture. Iran additionally made an attempt to give Afghan children access to education and medical care, even if adult refugees had frequently encountered substantial obstacles in obtaining these facilities.

Literature Review

Rizvi stated that in spite of the difficulties brought about by their influx, Pakistan has accepted Afghan refugees because of historical, cultural, and religious linkages. Tensions over grazing areas, job competition, and pressure on natural resources like water and forests, and socioeconomic effects on host communities are some of these difficulties. The endeavors of Pakistan and global organizations to tackle these concerns by means of policy interventions and allocation of resources are emphasized. While it could benefit from clearer organization and further depth in certain areas, it offers valuable insights into the humanitarian, social, and economic aspects of hosting refugees (Rizvi, 1984).

Nasreen Ghufuran emphasizes over conducting a thorough screening process and distinguishing between refugees and economic migrants, while also taking into account the geopolitical, regional, historical, and societal aspects. She highlights the complex character of Afghan refugees and the need for a subtle, non-intrusive, inclusive strategy to handle them which would have to be based on mutual respect, collaboration, and comprehension of Afghanistan's varied circumstances (Ghufuran, 2006).

Khan examined the socioeconomic effects of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, notably in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), this paper draws attention to a number of problems, including social ills, economic hardship, ecological unbalance, and problems related to law and order resulting from the extended presence of refugees (Khan, 2021).

Afghan Refugees: Opportunity or Threat for the Locals?

The majority of Afghan refugees who fled their nation landed in Balochistan and NWFP, which are the two provinces of Pakistan. Although some of them took refuge elsewhere, the most of the camps for refugees were located in these two provinces. Since the large-scale immigration, tensions between the local community and the refugee population had been anticipated. Nonetheless, there hasn't been any significant animosity from the local populace thus far. Compared to the 1990s, there was greater acceptance of refugees in the 1980s. They weren't seen as a social or economic threat. The villagers voluntarily offered assistance and shelter to the evacuated populace, treating them as fellow Muslims in need. According to 87% of respondents by a nationally representative poll conducted in April 1980, Pakistan's leadership had to help the Afghan refugees. In the same survey, a follow-up question informed participants about the potential expenses associated with providing assistance to Afghan refugees. The goal of this was to see if they would change their minds after seeing it. When informed that helping the Afghan refugees could incite Soviet animosity, only 3% of respondents changed their minds. In 1982, 1983, and 1984, this public opinion survey was conducted again. Support towards the Afghan refugees among the general population somewhat declined, but it was still overwhelmingly high. Additionally, the 1984 study showed that people were willing to give private assistance to the migrants. Only 13% disagreed that Pakistanis should assist the Afghan refugees in their individual capacity (Gillani, 1994). It is noteworthy that the people continued to support the Afghans at a higher level even after it became apparent that they were a huge burden and that there was a possibility that spies would infiltrate them. Approximately half of the respondents were afraid of sabotage by infiltrators, and two-thirds thought that migrants were an economic burden. The lack of tension between the local population and the refugees appeared to be based on the general public's support for the refugees, despite the fact that this support came with a price: it invited Soviet hostility, was costly economically, and posed a threat to the peace and order in the area. Throughout time, the local populace's perspective evolved (Abraham, 1989). At first, the refugees had been welcomed as brothers and sisters in Islam. However, locals called for their control, if not their repatriation, as their numbers increased and the cost of caring for them started to heavily burden Pakistan. They wanted them to go back because they were tired of their extended stay, but some of them were realistic enough to realize that they might never choose to return because life here was better than it was in their war-torn home country. At first, the refugees had been welcomed as brothers and sisters in Islam. However, locals called for their control, if not their repatriation, as their numbers increased and the cost of caring for them started to heavily burden Pakistan. They wanted them to go back because they were tired of their extended stay, but some of them were realistic enough to realize that they might never choose to return because life here was better than it was in their war-torn home country (Turton, 2002). Several explanations were cited by government authorities as justification for their shifting policies and attitudes. 1. Pakistan's deteriorating economy, which they claimed prevented the government from continuing to aid refugees; 2. The decrease in foreign financial assistance in support of the refugees; 3. The former Soviet Union departure from the Afghanistan in the month of February 1989 (Ruiz, 2001).

Numerous migrants claim that both locals and Pakistani officials have made it plain that they are unwanted and have made their lives more tough. "All things are being carried out by the authorities to abuse the Afghan refugees," claims Dost Mohammad, renowned politician from Afghanistan who took refuge in Peshawar camp, close to the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. "All of us are poor people but the international community shouldn't leave us in a lurch." The residents afterwards, although, closing the

friendly door, but they hadn't publicly protested the Afghans' extended stay and allowed them to carry on with their activities and commerce (Yusufzai., 2010).

Advantages of Afghanistan Refugees for the Job Market

There is a food production and revenue resource gap in the economy of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), home to the majority of Afghan refugees. Due to the province's tiny revenue base, the federal government funds nearly the whole budget for development. Relief aid was initially given to the refugees by the government in coordination with other governments and international organizations. The assistance provided to the refugees by the Pakistani government and foreign organizations was insufficient to meet their needs. A few migrants invested in Pakistan after relocating with their valuables. As a result, the refugees started working for themselves in addition to joining the formal job market (Kaplan, 2013).

The regional economy benefited from the capital assets brought by Afghan refugees and their adoption of self-employment. More money had been pouring into Peshawar in search of returns. The fact that refugees were involved in a variety of trades and own stores in Peshawar's major trading hubs was crucial in this regard. The entrance of refugee transit in the shape of buses and trucks resulted in a noticeable development of the transportation services. According to a 1992 private survey, the Afghan population owned at least 75% of the city's wagons and minibuses. The same article claims that they have a major interest in the freight hauling industry (Khan M. , 2000).

International assistance strengthened several local markets, while refugees themselves developed the infrastructure in the area. It resulted in the construction of roads, irrigation systems, and forests. This helped Pakistan's economy by directly employing locals in addition to refugees. Regarding the economic effects of refugees on the province, there are two main points of view in the NWFP. There are many who believe that the majority of refugees have not integrated into the province's economy and have instead benefited from outside funding sources that are separate from the province's economy. They have not evidently depleted provincial resources or adversely affected the well-being of Peshawar's local population. Their land and food are provided by the government freely; thus, they are essentially peripheral to the province's economy as they have their own source of income and housing (Khan, 2021). Afghans took advantage of every business opportunity presented to them. There are two main causes for this. Firstly, the refugee inflow had led to a rise in the population of NWFP, necessitating the provision of more services to fulfill the growing demand. When it was possible, additionally the residents or the refugees made efforts in response to this. Second, the resources that the Afghans invested were brought with them. Their restricted ability to travel freely to other regions of Pakistan was the primary cause of the concentration of investment in Balochistan and the NWFP. Proximity and ethnicity were significant factors. This does not negate the fact that Afghans had made investments in companies located in other regions of Pakistan. Other cities where refugees had opened shops and rented spaces were Islamabad and Karachi. Pakistan's economy benefited monetarily from these efforts, as refugees were perceived to have done this. Not everyone shares this view, though, as not all refugees were wealthy or lacked the means to make investments in their new nation. Tensions developed between the local business community and the wealthier Afghan elite as a result of increases in rents that were now higher than the means of the small business class (Hilali, 2017).

Negative Consequences for the Local Market

The NWFP's economy was hampered by the refugees. To the dismay of the local populace, they had spread throughout the cities and rural areas, gaining employment and business. The scarcity of jobs increased, locals' earnings declined due to the surplus of inexpensive labor, and rents increased as housing competition increased. In comparison to their Pakistani colleagues, refugees were generally willing to work for 25% less money. In order to establish themselves, refugees operated small enterprises and charged competitive pricing. Numerous local merchants noticed that the aid that refugees received from Pakistani authorities and international organizations augmented their income. They might operate on narrower margins and yet turned a profit since they did not have the same social responsibilities as the neighborhood merchants and did not have to pay taxes. As a result, mostly affected the local traders. The refugees posed a serious threat to them. Local vendors had changed vocations or relocated in some Peshawar markets. Rents were raised beyond the means of the small commercial class in Afghanistan, which led to conflict between the richer elite and the local business community. The rich Afghan migrants also got around the rule limiting their property rights by getting National Identity Cards, residence permits, as well as passports via brokers who charged exorbitant amounts (Ashraf, 1988). After that, the bulk of the workers who had fled their homes were employed in urban areas, largely on the construction industries and other daily casual jobs. The labor supply rose as a result of the significant number of refugees that entered the workforce. Labor earnings decreased as a result of this. "They accept Rs. 70 or Rs.80 if we request Rs. 100 per day. A Peshawar laborer remarked, "They have destroyed over livelihood". The nearby house owners, particularly in the University Town neighborhood where a great number of wealthy refugees and foreign missions lived, shifted to less expensive neighborhoods and began charging magnificent rents for their own homes. This kind of thing never happened in the cantonment area (Taylor, 2020).

Social Repercussions

The following section provides a detailed discussion of the social repercussions, including the spreading of both nations' norms and traditions, social integration, and strain on medical and educational resources, as well as an increase in crime, drug sales, and other issues. A social cohesion prior to delving deeply into the examination of the social effects of the migrants/refugees appeared but after raising a few questions concerning the locals' response to the entrance of Afghan refugees and their current opinion of them after nearly 25 years of hosting them were posed to explore the reality. The study so demonstrates that because of the Muslim brotherhood, they were welcomed and provided with land to pitch their shelters, freshwater for drinking, foods to eat, and clothes to wear upon their arrival. Finding out if the early sentiments of Muslim brotherhood and sympathy had taken on a tangible form through social integration between the host community and the refugees were one of the researcher's goals. Thus, the percentage of locals and refugees getting married would be set as a measure of social integration. According to the ratio from the four separate areas, although though both communities shared the same culture, language, religion, and ethnicity, 76% of locals and 34% of refugees indicated that there were no intermarriages occurring between them. However, only a tiny percentage – roughly 34% of immigrants and 20% of locals – said that there were occasional small-scale marriages in both populations. Researchers from both groups determined that the low trend in intermarriages was due to cultural, customary, and traditional differences preventing large-scale intermarriages. Because they were just temporarily residing in Pakistan, refugees demanded a pride premium, and they disliked exogamy together with the locals (Khan, 2021).

Positive Experiences

The United Nations estimated that as of June 30, 2022, there were about 1.3 million refugees and asylum seekers in Pakistan. Afghan refugee music groups and bands playing in Pashto and Persian had overtaken their traditional Pakistani rivals, who were mostly retired police and military personnel. The Afghan's utilization of avant-garde music was responsible for their enormous popularity. Nonetheless, this tendency increased profanity, particularly at weddings and other joyous events. While there was little contact between the host society and Afghan refugees in Islamabad, some occasionally went to family functions like marriage ceremonies. Balochistani respondents stated that they frequently engaged with the Afghan population and attended their wedding ceremonies. It was reported that kids from the two villages played together and engaged closely. There was a lot of social interaction in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) between the host and refugee populations. They had a pleasant relationship. According to respondents from KP, Pakistan had done a fantastic job of caring for refugees over the last few decades, which had improved Pakistan's reputation internationally. According to the respondents, they had Afghan business partners who had assisted them in expanding their enterprises and had also given loans when needed. The welcoming community said that immigrants were industrious individuals whose businesses provided additional job prospects for the locals (Javed, 2022).

Health

During the early days of the refugee crisis, there were numerous hygienic or sanitary problems. It was evident that a multitude of issues arose from overcrowding. Refugees led unclean lives. In reality, these were the people who lived in the remote, undulating regions that were devoid of any populous locations. Peshawar's population doubled as a result of the refugee inflow. Sanitation issues were a result of the filthy and unclean lives that refugees had to lead. Additionally, due to unsanitary conditions, several infectious diseases such as dysentery, diarrhea, Leishmania, gynecological disorders, worm infections, malaria, and tuberculosis spread across Peshawar. Certain diseases were carried by refugees or made worse by their arrival, which led to their dissemination across the community. Basic Health Units (BHUs) had been built in refugee camps by the Pakistani government and donor groups to provide medical care. However, the refugee crisis was out of these facilities' control, and as a result, local hospitals were overworked and overcrowded (khan, 2021).

Education

Even if the children of refugees attended schools in camps, the number of refugees had overwhelmed the capacity of the local schools. When asked how satisfied they were with the local education system and the facilities provided for their kids by the local government schools, because of the flood of refugee children enrolling in these schools, around 77% of people reported unhappiness with the facilities and educational standards for their kids at local educational institutions. In addition to it, a large number of refugee children attended local Madrasa schools with native students (khan, 2021).

Criminal Behavior (Kalashinkov Culture)

When a lot of strangers move into or reside in a community, it can lead to security issues and disturb the tranquility of the region. When inquiries concerning the local community's duty and peace and security issues were made of the local populace, approximately 60% of the local population claimed that the number of crimes had

increased as a result of the refugee inflow. Murder, daily dacoity, and other crimes had become commonplace in the area. A little over half of Afghan refugees disclaimed any accountability, claiming instead that locals committed crimes and assigned the blame to the migrants. Roughly thirty-three percent of refugees claimed that certain very few refugees had tarnished the reputation of all refugees by engaging in different criminal activities. Aside from this, it was clear that the NWFP did not have any automatic weapons with civilians prior to the Afghan War. Nowadays, Kalashnikov might be seen everywhere in NWFP; an estimate placed the number of Kalashnikov in Pakistan with the indigenous population at over 3.5 million. Therefore, the introduction of these weapons into the community was the fault of the refugees (khan, 2021).

Housing

Following the refugee crisis, real estate and rental prices increased. There had been a noticeable increase in real estate and rental costs in the NWFP, especially in Peshawar, the home of all the foreign mission headquarters and the administrative center for Afghan refugees. Surveys of trade, commerce, and store rentals were conducted, but they were not very successful because neither the locals nor the refugees provided accurate rates. A property that cost Rs. 5,000 a month in 1980 was reportedly worth Rs. 50,000 in 1985 after two years of advance rent. This was confirmed by numerous real estate brokers. As many families would live in one house, the rent per capita was not costly for the refugees. This was the case for many of the refugees who lived in and around Peshawar. Finding homes in Peshawar at reasonable rent was extremely tough for the locals who relocated there for work or services. As mentioned above, the local house owners migrated to less expensive districts or colonies, renting out their own properties for handsome rents, notably in the University Town area where the majority of wealthier refugees and foreign missions were stationed. This kind of circumstance did not occur in the cantonment area. For security reasons, it was discouraged for foreign missions and refugees to live in the cantonment. There was a serious housing crisis in the city. Peshawar's rents were comparable to those of Islamabad and Karachi, two other high-rent cities, albeit for different reasons. In contrast, the circumstances in villages were distinct. It was not customary in villages to rent out houses. In NWFP, a renter or anybody else received a house free of charge in exchange for providing the landlord with a number of gratuitous services. Rents in rural areas were relatively cheap, therefore many refugees who were not living in camps and were unable to pay the exorbitant rents in the metropolis moved into the countryside. This helped the impoverished locals since it increased their scant income sources (Taylor, 2020).

Affect upon Renewable Natural Resources

Since these refugees might have a significant long-term impact, it was especially concerning how they might affect renewable natural resources. Trees were chopped down to make way for shelter, and branches were gathered to make charcoal and firewood. Cut foliage was used as animal feed. Clearing the ground of vegetation was necessary for farming; in severe cases, tree roots were even dug up and burned as firewood. The land eventually lost its suitability for even the most minimal kinds of cultivation. Only about 12% of the area's natural forest cover remained due to the swift and unchecked deforestation that followed in the 1980s. A UNHCR research paper claimed that the Turmeric Forest of Gird-e-Jungle in the Chaghai district (Balochistan) had completely disappeared and that no rehabilitation had taken place in the area since the 1980s, when the Afghan refugee crisis begun (Ghufran, 2010).

Non-official Sectors

Because they had limited access to formal employment possibilities, refugees in Pakistan frequently worked in informal or unregulated jobs. The majority of Pakistan's labor works in the informal sector, which gave refugees a place to engage in the economy despite not receiving official recognition or protection. Both registered and unregistered Afghan refugees encountered difficulties such as low capital endowments, symbolic abuse (such as bribery and unequal treatment by employers), and these issues drove them into informal labor environments. It was crucial to recognize and promote refugees' engagement in the informal economy for their livelihoods and general well-being because that unofficial realm gave them access to fundamental human rights, resources, and social welfare that might not be easily obtained through official channels. Three labor market indicators – formal employment, informal work, and unemployment – were used to examine the effects of Afghan refugees between 1979 and 2022 (Alimia S. , 2023).

Culture of Drugs

Refugees brought drugs like opium and other comparable substances into Pakistani society. Pakistan's history made it abundantly evident that there was no drug culture or drug addiction in Pakistan before to the 1980s. The superpower rivalry in Pakistan gave rise to the drug culture, as Afghan war fighters were permitted to grow poppies and then turn them into heroin in factories built with assistance from Western powers. This allowed the warriors to be financially supported. As a result, Pakistan's drug trade grew, leading to an increase in drug addiction among its citizens. This drug addiction affected not just the general public but also several Pakistani schools, colleges, and institutions (khan, 2021).

Global Cooperation

The United Nations Refugee Agency, World Food Program (WFP), along with other pertinent UN organizations, in particular, received a very favorable and passionate response to the crisis from the world community. The Pakistani government served as a facilitator for the resettlement, aid, rehabilitation, and relief of the Afghan refugees inside Pakistan. The WFP graciously provided food supplies to the Afghan refugees residing within Pakistan up to 1989(The New York Times, 1987). However, the WFP gradually withdrew from the picture after the signing of the "Geneva Accord." At first, the WFP drastically cut back on the contents in the food basket intended for Afghan refugees after beginning to pull back the scope of their general feeding program. Since September 30, 1995, they had completely stopped providing general nourishment to Afghan refugees. According to an assessment conducted in 1991–1992 by the Pakistani government in collaboration with the United Nations Population Fund regarding environmental degradation and infrastructure damage in Pakistan, a total of US\$208.00 million had been lost (Rupees 6240 million in the North West Frontier Province and US \$760.884 million in the Balochistan province). Another study carried out by the Pakistani government in 2000–01 claimed that the country had lost a total of Rs. 8219.286 million as a result of Afghan refugees. According to the provinces, the losses were as followed: Punjab 8219.286 million, Baluchistan 1828.250 million, and NWFP 5669.876 million (Rizvi, 1984).

State Policies

Pakistan's primary legislation governing foreigners pertains to entry, presence, and departure and is known as the Foreigners Act, 1946. Authorities can restrict foreigners'

movements within Pakistan and refuse entry to anybody without a valid travel document under the terms of the Foreigner's Order of 1951, which was revised in 2000. It made a distinction between refugees and other foreigners, but it made no special provisions for the former, who were typically regarded as unlawful migrants until they received UNHCR recognition. Valid till 2018, Proof of Registration cards were issued to Afghan refugees in 2005. Pakistan's laws do not accommodate refugees, and the country has not ratified any international conventions on refugees. Refugees frequently experience abuse, incarceration, and deportation. Along with international agencies such as UNHCR, refugee affairs are overseen by the Interior Ministry and the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees. International standards for refugee status were not met by refugees from a number of nations, including Somalia, Burma, and Iraq; they were not afforded state protection due to a lack of regulations and porous borders (Zubair, 2019).

Conclusion

For Pakistan, refugees have presented both an opportunity and a threat. The host nation has profited from them in a number of ways, and the political risks and costs involved have been overstated. But more than the refugees themselves, the security, economic, political, and social threats resulting from Afghans' extended stay are mostly the product of the country's poor policies. This does not negate the threat that refugees present. They do have political and economic ramifications, particularly in light of Pakistan's current circumstances. But if the government puts in place a sensible plan for handling the migrants and assisting their ultimate return, these effects could be lessened.

Without their employment by the government for strategic goals, refugees wouldn't have grown into a significant threat. Furthermore, if locals and government authorities hadn't engaged in illegal operations like buying real estate, smuggling, and selling fake identity cards, refugees would not have led to a rise in crimes and social problems. Pakistani officials had to update their refugee policy and stress the importance of the safe return of Afghans as the detrimental effects of their stay became increasingly evident. They came to see that the only way to lessen the political and financial burden of harboring them was through repatriation. In order to manage the residual Afghan people in a way that benefits the hosts and lessens the threats that have damaged the nation, Pakistan should establish institutional procedures. Businesses owned by migrants, lodging outside of camps, and education to lessen animosity between refugees and locals all require monitoring and care. Afghans with a business sense and education ought to be let to participate in worthwhile endeavors that benefit both societies. There is a security risk to both countries from those Afghans who back the Taliban insurgency on both sides of the border. Therefore, in order to limit these people's movements and acts, Pakistan and Afghanistan should cooperate.

Recommendations

The main recommendation is that, rather than interacting with the tribal society through coercion, the Pakistani state should make significant efforts to develop the tribal territory.

- The provision of public goods and fundamental social services, such as justice, security, health, and other such amenities, ought to be the Pakistani government's main priority.
- The most crucial intangible factor for the expansion of state power in the tribal regions of ex-FATA is the establishment of trust between the Pakistani state and the tribal society.

- It is crucial that all development projects be owned locally, and that indigenous tribe members provide their support.

It's also necessary to harmonize official and informal authorities in order to devolve authority to local administration. This will facilitate the government's official authority's future development and enable it to function more efficiently.

- Between the tribal people and the Pakistani state, a new social compact is needed, particularly in regards to the exclusive use of force and taxation. These two paths can be developed by mutual trust between the tribal society and the state.
- Local tribal communities ought to be included in ex-FATA reform efforts.
- In order to maintain its legitimacy, the state needs to deal with every issue that could lead to hostilities with the tribal society. Tribal territories are underdeveloped, and there is a lack of participation in national politics as well as inequalities, and isolation of tribal civilization.

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