



RESEARCH PAPER**Pakistan's Counter-Terrorism Journey toward Sustainable Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions (2001-2020)**

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ABSTRACT

Pakistan reclaimed its position as a frontline strong state and implemented a counter terrorism plan that included both military and a non-military component. The study evaluates the significant counter terrorism operations that took place in the Pakistan between 2001 and 2023 and critically looks at the tactics, obstacles, and limitations of Pakistan's counter terrorism activities. Since 9/11, Pakistan has been the most terrorist-affected nation and losing almost 8,000 military personnel and nearly 40,000 of civilians. Pakistan must also deal with the fallout from the military actions against the both domestic and foreign terrorists, including religious extremism, insurgency, cross-border infiltration, wealthy terrorist attacks on military and public target, and a heart-breaking string of suicide attacks. With regard to the domestic, regional, and global security concerns, Pakistan is dealing with the fallout from its unsuccessful counter terrorism strategy. Even though Pakistan has already launched multiple military operations to eradicate the Taliban and al-Qaeda sanctuaries, the United States and international community have not been satisfied because of the country's intangible scheme strategy, incident-to-incident counter approach, emphasis on ceasefire and a negotiation, discrimination between good and bad Taliban, policy that is sympathetic to domestic terrorist groups, weak internal security, and inconclusive military operations. In the context of decision-making and adversary identification while combating the extremism, militancy, and terrorism, Pakistan urgently requires a very significant revamp of its policies and to create a good balance in the civil-military ties.

KEYWORDS Counter-terrorism, Post-9/11 security policy, Pakistan, War on Terror, Counterinsurgency

Introduction

Pakistan has been dealing with a persistent wave of anti-state terrorism acts, suffering significant economic losses of nearly 70 billion dollars and the deaths of 40,000 civilian and military personnel. Operation Al-Mizan (2002), Operation Kalosha (2004), Operation Earth Quake (2007), Operation Right Path (2008), Operation Lion Heart (2008), Operation True Path 2009, Operation Just Path 2009, Operation Path of Salvation 2009, Operation White Mountain 2011, Operation Zarb-e-Azab (2014), and the ongoing operation Radd -ul- Faasad (2017) were the main coercive measures carried out by the Pakistan Army between 2001 and 2019. The cost Pakistan a staggering \$120 billion and nearly 70,000 military and civilian lives.

Foreign powers intensified their proxy war in Pakistan's northern regions. The terrorist groups made an effort to sow discord among communities and sects. Additionally, the dissidents gained influence and strength and established strong roots in Afghanistan. Pakistan had to prevent militants and radicals from infiltrating its tribal areas as part of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In order to support OEF, Pakistan sent a sizable contingent of troops along the Durand line. It also used a significant amount of its logistical reserves to support the combined forces and used all of its might, potential, and strategic acumen to eradicate terrorism from the entire nation.

The world, especially the country-wide military operations *Zarb e Azab* and *Radd ul Faasad*, which were launched to smash the terrorists and dissidents throughout the entire Pakistan, have acknowledged Pakistan's success rate. The prime minister, president, and parliament-Pakistan's top decision-makers-also suggested non-military means of putting an end to terrorist activity in the country. The Anti-terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997 is one of several acts and changes to the current legal framework pertaining to terrorism that the Pakistani government has promulgated. To increase the severity of anti-terrorism activities, new legislative proceedings were introduced and passed into law (roy, 2019).

Literature Review

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's government decided to take all necessary measures to quell political violence and separatist movements in the 1970s after encountering tumultuous political opposition and nationalist movements in Baluchistan and NWFP (Ziring, 2000). The Bhutto government issued an order in October 1974 that created special tribunals to prevent "terrorism, subversion, and sabotage." The aforementioned ordinance gave the courts sole jurisdiction over accused acts of terrorism and other crimes and mandated that they hold speedy trials against them. Even though the courts were set up to combat the widespread violence and guarantee prompt justice, they were a glaring divergence from the existing legal system. Later, as part of The Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Court) Act, 1975, the parliament adopted the ordinance as a regular legislation. That statute marked the beginning of a new era in the history of future administrations adopted Pakistan's unique laws and tribunals to combat terrorism and terrorist acts as a new policy front (Shah, 2011).

Up until 1997, when the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997 was implemented by the then-government of Nawaz Sharif, the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Court) Act of 1975 remained in effect. The fundamental anti-terror statute now in effect is the ATA of 1997 days. Numerous laws were enacted by the shifting regimes to address the shifting demands of their respective eras in between the times when these two statutes were in effect. The primary goal of these regulations was to ensure that cases involving suspected terrorist activities were tried as quickly as possible (Hussain, 2012)

Pakistan still faces a revival of terrorist operations despite large investments in political, military, economic, and human resources as well as government claims that it is fighting terrorism. D'Souza et al. (2023) claim that the Taliban's comeback in Afghanistan has given organizations like the Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) more confidence, particularly in Pakistan's northern areas, which has resulted in an increase in terrorist attacks and public demonstrations against this resurgent threat. This comeback is supported by reports from organizations such as the Jamestown Foundation (2023) and Relief-Web (2022), which emphasize a rise in terrorist actions, including extortions and attacks, especially in the northern region.

The Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies also provides data on the alarming trend of rising terrorist activities, forecasting a 51% rise in violent incidents from August 2021 to August 2022, leading to the deaths of 'significant' number of people, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Additionally, the more current PIPS (2024) shows that there was a 17% increase in terrorist violence in 2023. This only highlights the more pressing need to confront the new threat and the growing anxieties of people. The literature study part describes and investigates discursively the most recent developments and incidents about the resurgence of terror. As it is understood from the sources above, the terrorism attacks have come under criticism from the general masses of Pakistan, which have doubts about the effectiveness of the Pakistani government's counterterrorism efforts. The country's people worry about issues such as the return of terrorism and what changes should be made to the state's counterterrorism approach. The subject matter of the present study is quite serious and urgent so it's a scholarly work that critically analyses on counter terrorism policy in the light of seriousness of the subject. The reason for studying the policy is to provide an analysis of the literature relating to the policy and give special focus on the weaknesses of the policy. (D'Souza et al., 2023).

The NACTA Act of 2018 was enacted in policy formulating, which paved the way for a coordinated system in coordinating and implementing national counterterrorism policies (Ahmed, 2020). Organizing in policymaking, research and intelligence is part of the NACTA's mission, creating a holistic space for various actors in the counterterrorism field. Against this backdrop, Pakistan has beefed up anti-money laundering (AML) policies as a part of the struggle against the vice of funding terror. As a member of Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Pakistan has pledged to follow international standards to fight money laundering and raising funds for terrorist activities. (Mukhtar, 2018) Aside from these pieces of legislation.

This is the introduction of a significant initiative by the government of Pakistan, which is dubbed as "Paigham-e-Pakistan", and belongs to the province's strategy to counter extremist narratives (Yaseen, et. al., 2018; Babur & Noor, 2023). Theologians from different denominations blessed this national story, making terrorism a bad path, and spreading the notion that the message of peace is inviting to conservatives. But, Babur and Noor (2023) challenged this by arguing that Paigham-e-Pakistan is a precondition of combating the radicalization processes which ultimately culminate in terrorism using the ideology and ideology theater. Although Pakistan's legislation structure and legal framework were very comprehensive, the implementation procedure faced its own challenges and some hindrances such as lack of coordinated efforts between the Federal agencies and Provincial governments, delays in the court, and limitations of law enforcement's power (Sifarish & Liaqat 2023; Karamat, et. al., 2019). Disputes also noted human rights related issues regarding the legal framework, in particular about preventative detention and overly broad definitions of terrorism which could be misapplied to attack minority groups or political dissent. This does, however, emphasize the need for continual evaluation and change as well as the need for balance between security needs and human rights commitments (Nawab, et al., 2021; Babur & Noor, 2023).

Police and intelligence in Pakistan is extremely important but also a bone of contention in the fight against terrorism. Organizations like the much-feared Counter Terrorism Department (Ghani, 2018; Shah, 2016) and the infamous ISI monitor, infiltrate, investigate, and arrest suspected militants (Khalid, 2017). They are, however, shrouded in considerable doubt about their use, and their lack of oversight means that they raise human rights concerns, including extrajudicial executions and disappearances (Arif et al., 2020). Lack of training, coordination, and resources significantly limit effectiveness, however (Shah, 2016; Khalid, 2017). Although recent reforms have seen some gains in supporting

counterterrorism (CT) capabilities, the progress on facilitating CI sharing and interagency cooperation (both of which are essential to achieve success) has been slow (Islam et al., 2020). Wherever Pakistan goes on the pathway of freedom and security, it is still dancing on the edge. As a vanguard of radicalism, its intelligence agencies bring about the apprehension and less-sung support. A strategy that is neither the lack of accountability of the institutions nor the compromised capabilities of the agents to infiltrate into the elaborate terrorist circuits is a balanced approach.

Essential for achieving success. Rather than reacting to an ad hoc basis to policy, we need to move towards a thoughtful, deliberate approach to change. The counter terrorism (CT) operation launched by the Pakistani government is said to be a belief in the fight that combines military and nonmilitary approaches and while Pakistan has made impressive strides in the field, the operation has also been confronted with difficult hurdles and criticism, especially from the middle of the 2010s. As reported by Basit (2023) and Gohar et al. (2023) among others, some of Pakistan's recent military operations have been able to continually corral terrorist groups such as the TTP or Haqqani Network, which has helped turn Pakistan's operations so effective on the ground. The operations involved targeting and destroying infrastructure related to terrorism such as IED manufacturing, training centres, and media outlets that have been under the control of the terrorist groups. It is important to keep in mind that these operations are strategic and if these operations are not as decisive as they can be, these terrorist acts can be stopped (Khattak et al., 2018)

It has set the MDGs objectives in Pakistan and managed to attain merely four out of 16 goals despite investing more than Rs 4.06 trillion from 2012 to 2013. Although there were improvements in health, education, and social welfare, they were not satisfactory when compared with their regional counterparts. In 2015, the MDGs were replaced by the SDGs of which 193 countries including Pakistan have set 17 goals and 169 indicators. In February 2016, the SDGs were officially adopted as Pakistan national goals in the National Assembly for the first time. The countries record for the SDG 2025, however, paints a different picture, placing it 140th / 167 countries with an over-all score of 57 percent. A lack of political commitment and execution is one of the most critical weaknesses in Pakistan (Aslam& Muzaffar, 2025)

Ahmad (2020) reported that the missions have highly decreased the incidence and magnitude of the terrorist attacks in Pakistan. This is an indicator of CT's effectiveness (Faiaz, 2019), leading to increased stability and national security. Moreover, Khan et al. (2023) concluded that Pakistan has been successful in isolating terrorist groups thanks to its involvement in the global counterterrorism mechanism including cooperation with international organizations and implementation of terms of treaties among various nations. Moreover, this cooperation has been vital in tackling cross border terror and obtaining foreign cooperation in CT operations (Fair 2019), says Habibur Rehman, 2023.

Professor Ahmar believes that Pakistan can never achieve sustainable development if peace is defined in terms of the battle or military victories alone instead of state institutions reaching and proving their strength and fair governance. He attributes the origin of the Pakistan Conflict issue to the times following Independence, when the new governments created the exclusionary mechanism of the older colonial governments instead of eliminating them. Marginalized communities, especially Pashtuns in the tribal belt areas, were deprived of political representation, economic opportunity and the provision of legal protection historical drivers of radicalisation and armed resistance. The concept of development for some and not for others is not real development in any sense and is what Pakistan has witnessed, Ahmar says. In this kind of setting, conflict is a by-product of injustice, or a natural reaction to it. Temporary calm will be the result of military

operations until those structures are reformed, i.e., until lasting peace is achieved. (Ahmar, Moonis, 2021)

Material and Methods

The qualitative approach was deliberately used, as it was found to be a method which would be suitable for discovering factors such as context and social phenomena as it is micro-level nature makes it difficult to involve numerical consensus. It is a technique that allows an in-depth investigation of topic interpretations, motivations, and meaning. It can enable the researcher to examine both what happened and how and why things happened in a particular manner. Data will be collected using a wide range of sources of information through detailed research in the library to enable triangulation and for sound analysis. The main source material will be largely comprised of official files from the government, policy documents, legislative records, and archive documents. Primary sources are lost or original sources that contain contemporaneous accounts and relatively unmanipulated documentation that is essential for the groundwork of the factual history of the topic.

Additional primary materials, such as personal letters, diaries, memoirs, organizational memoirs, statistical data collected by relevant organizations, and letters, will also be examined. These sources provide essential insights into the events responsible for the creation of the document's content, as well as how the events were experienced and interpreted at the time of the event.

Results and Discussion

Historical Context of Terrorism in Pakistan (2001-2023)

Due in significant part to Pakistan's involvement in "War on Terror," a surge of terrorism emerged in Pakistan after 2001. Pakistan had worst wave of the terrorism starting in 2008. Since then, terrorism has grown to pose a very serious threat to Pakistan's political and socioeconomic structure. The number of deaths has increased due to the problem of terrorism; for example, the number of deaths grew by over 67 percent between 2006 and 2016. Therefore, the international community is examining the problem of terrorism from a global perspective and attempting to pinpoint the driving forces underlying the creation of a ruthless mentality. However, the primary cause of the fierce disobedience in Pakistan was the country's participation in the War against Terror. (Rauf, December 2019)

Sectarian Division and Ethnic Fault Lines

The first instance was anti-Ahmadiya riots that took place in Lahore in 1953. The first martial law was imposed as a result of this tragedy. Although there were sectarian conflicts following this episode, they were minor in scope. Although there were other sectarian incidents during the Ayub Khan's rule, the attack on the Muharram Procession in a town close to Khairpur, Sindh, was the bloodiest. A number of incidents around the close of the 1970s exacerbated sectarian tensions, which in turn created a culture of violence in Pakistani society. Among these were the effects of the Iranian Revolution and the Shia community's empowerment through Iranian proxy warfare. Pakistan's role in the flood of Afghan refugees that arrived in Pakistan as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Terrorists use brainwashing as one of their main strategies. A number of suicide bombers who were apprehended alive disclosed the existence of Pakistani Taliban schools, which were set up to brainwash young people. They abducted teenagers from parks,

streets, and schools and taught them that they were God's chosen ones and that they couldn't refuse to commit suicide. Most people believe that terrorism is the result of brainwashing. Hatred is spread by masterminds in a specific setting and in the name of religion. This practice began in 1979 when Pakistan, a frontline state against the Soviet Union and a US ally, ceded its territory to the US and other allies in order to foster Jihadi culture. It is fair to assume that a large number of people were brainwashed during the Soviet Union's engagement in Afghanistan, and they persisted in their efforts to further Islam after the war ended. The purpose of the religious schools, also known as madaris, was to train warriors (Muzaffar, et. al., 2017). They carried the vocabulary of jihad to Pakistan and were indoctrinated with a religious fervor to expel non-believers from Afghanistan.

Afghanistan Border and Tribal Areas of Pakistan

The badly maintained porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been the main cause of tension and the attraction of foreign powers to the area. This porous border poses a severe threat to Pakistan's domestic stability because Islamist terrorist organizations have taken up residence in the country's tribal areas, gradually becoming a continual source of worry for Pakistan. An atmosphere that was favorable to long-term instability, including terrorist attacks in Pakistan, was produced by poor government and the continued presence of US troops in the region, which supported militancy throughout much of the region. Many people have lost their homes as a result of drone attacks, and others have also lost their belongings. Dissatisfaction among people seeking shelter in Pakistan's settled areas persisted due to a lack of cooperation by the authorities. This ultimately led to many becoming resentful and joining anti-state actors. It is fair to say that the main cause of Pakistan's unfavorable internal situation is the government's negligence. This has also led to alienation and deprivation of people.

Pakistan's Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2001-2023)

Brief history of Pakistan's Anti-Terrorism Laws

The Battle against fear based oppression is troublesome to win by simply criminalizing the most act causing passing and enduring. It is firstly imperative to examine the criminological perspectives of it that stem from inchoate offenses. Offenses such as empowering, directing, supporting and Abetting, and securing fear based oppressors and psychological militant acts are educated by the idea of worldwide Jihad. The reaction of the law towards debilitating such acts in a transcendently Muslim Society is worth exploring. So remote, most trials of fear based oppressor suspects target those who are battling the government. Extraordinary courts have been made beneath the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (ATA), Security of Pakistan Act, 2014 (POPA) and the twenty-first revision To the Pakistani Structure 2015, which built up military courts for attempting fear mongers. These laws were included to the two essential statutes, the Code of Criminal Method, 1898 and the Pakistan Correctional Code, which too give for terrorism-related offenses. The Objective of this consider is to recognize the crevices in these laws and how these holes can be filled While keeping in intellect the modern security challenges.

Anti-Terrorism Laws in Pakistan

Pakistan's primary chief enactment on criminal laws is the Pakistan Correctional Code, 1860 (PPC), acquired from the British, with alterations to form it coherent with Islamic values; the PPC isn't a total code to bargain with the violations of fear mongering. In any case, areas such as 122 bargain with the offen ses of waging/attempting to wage

War against Pakistan, collection of arms to wage war, area 124, rebellion, area 131 of Uprising, fiendishness and seizing in Segment 46 and 402-B and C are expounded in detail within the PPC (Pakistan Correctional Code, 1860). In any case, the Pakistan Correctional Code may not demonstrate to be comprehensive enactment to bargain with the changing characteristics of security. Beside the PPC, Pakistan drafted extraordinary enactment "Suppression of Fear monger Exercises (Extraordinary Courts) Acts (1974 to 1997)". The required for uncommon enactment was felt by the State to control the delayed partisan viciousness in Pakistan within the wake of the Zia administration.

Table 1
Time Line of Anti-Terrorism Oriented Legislation in Pakistan

Sr no.	Title	Year
01	Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act	1975
02	Special Courts For Speedy Trial Ordinance	1987
03	Terrorist Affected Areas	1990
04	Special Courts For Speedy Trial	1991
05	Special Courts For Speedy Act	1992
06	Anti-Terrorism law	1997

Proclamation of Anti-Terrorist Laws (ATA), 1997

Law, 2001; Open Obtainment Authoritative Master (Pakistan), 2001). Beneath Segment 6 of the ATA, fear based oppression is characterized as takes after:

Whoever, to strike dread within the individuals, or any area of the individuals, or to distance any segment of the individuals or to antagonistically influences agreement among distinctive segments of the individuals, Employments bombs, explosive or other hazardous or inflammable substances, or fire-arms, or other Deadly weapons or harms or harmful gasses or chemicals or other substances of a perilous Nature in such a way as to cause, or to be likely to cause the passing of, or damage to, any Individual or people, or harm to or pulverization of, property or disturbance of any supplies of Administrations, basic to the life of the community or shows fire-arms, or debilitates with the Utilize of drive open hirelings to avoid them from releasing their legal obligations commits A psychological militant act. (Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997).

Various National Level Policy Documents aiming to deal with the

Another challenge for as of now battling Pakistan government was impelled by The Budgetary Activity Errand Constrain (FATF) because it pronounced the monetary framework of Pakistan as Powerless and delicate i.e. for its capacity to control the tireless dread financing. The FATF has Put Pakistan on its notorious "grey" list on numerous times e.g. from 2008 to 2010; from 2012 to 2015 and from 2018 to 2022.

Challenges and Limitations

Incapable Counter-Terrorism Methodology

Military and nonmilitary alternatives reflect country's ineffectiveness for a counter fear based oppression methodology. Pakistan needs the counter fear mongering enactment in its ordinary lawful continuing history through the parliament it has demonstrated inconsequential for destruction of fear based oppression from the soil of Pakistan. (Muhammad Ibrahim, 2021)

Need of Fast Trials

On the one hand, Pakistan has fizzled to conduct fast trials of the suspected fear mongers and may not get any sensible victory to stop the exercises of the prohibited activist bunches which had begun working by the substitute names. For illustration, the Jama'at-ud-Dawah (JuD, previous LeT) has set up madrassas, schools, wellbeing centers, and clinics and consequently portrayed itself as a welfare organization.

Linkage with Country's Key Interface

There are a few critical covering inadequacies that driven to Pakistan toward ineffectualness of its counter psychological warfare policy in the setting of clearing out the fiendish of fear mongering. Pakistan's anti-terrorism technique is connected with its geostrategic and territorial environment, particularly managing with its eastern and western neighbors India and Afghanistan. Pakistan's arrangement intrigued within the case of India is associated with the Kashmir issue as Pakistan considers the Kashmir strife as „unfinished agenda“ of the parcel arrange of Joined together India.

The Proprietorship of U.S. driven “War on Terror”

Another critical calculate driving to the disappointment of Pakistan's counter psychological warfare endeavors was a need of advancement of a national agreement approximately the term „war on terror“ whether it is Pakistan's war or of the Joined together States. Pakistan armed force assigns WOT as Pakistan's possess war and calls To verbalize bolster from the masses to win this challenge. This could be famous from Common Kyani's (previous military chief) discourse of 14th Eminent 2012. On the other Hand, a few well known political parties, such as the obligatory PMLN, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Jama'at-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) Candidly depicted WOT as an American war or maybe of Pakistan. Subsequently, Military's exertion to battle the inner risk of terrorism questions its assurance And commitment within the nonappearance of back from the masses and political Authority. (Hussain,2010)

Obstacles to Sustainable Development in Pakistan

Pakistan Terrorism Case and its progressive shift towards institutional peacebuilding is one of the most complicated security cases of the twenty-first century. The nation has always been in the middle of a world war against terror since the 2001 September 11 attacks and has also been troubled by its own domestic woes. Two scholarly works with varying focus are discussed critically here regarding the same key question: has Pakistan's engagement in counterterrorism substantially lowered the likelihood of Pakistan's socio-economic progress towards sustainable peace, justices, and strong institutions as part of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16. In the first article authored by UM-E-Habiba Saeed, Rabia Naveed and Maryam BiBi, they provide broad insights into the performance of Pakistan in SDG implementation agenda and the underlying structural constraints arresting any meaningful progress. The second one is “Peace, Conflict Management and Sustainable Development in the context of Pakistan” written by Prof. Moonis Ahmar of the University of Karachi. As a combination they serve as a multi-layered explanation of how security failures and development inadequacies provide a vicious cycle that complicates the path for military success in the conflict against terrorism and civilian development to realize SDGs goals and targets in isolation (Aslam& Muzaffar, 2025a)

This qualitative research commences with a helpful historical background regarding Pakistan's approach to international development pledges ranging from MDGs era of 2000s to SDG Agenda of 2030. As per the authors Pakistan was able to achieve only

four out of 16 MDGs, having spent more than Rs 4.06 trillion in 2012-2013 with no commensurate results in the areas of health, education and social welfare. This was one of the main characteristics of Pakistan's development story, and shaped its SDG performance, with its heavy spending on outcomes that consistently failed to meet expectations.

Study offers an outline of a plethora of interrelated barriers. The authors rightly recognize cross-cutting challenges including overpopulation, which affects all SDG target areas. The political and governance environment has been volatile, with four successive Prime Ministers from 2015 to 2023, driving a regular recommissioning and termination of long term development plans. Every rupee channelled towards taking SDG action was subverted by the presence of corruption, whether institutional or individual. The authors also point to inadequate healthcare facilities in rural areas, food security status of 37.2 percent of the populace, education system doing more to provide a lot of students, and persistent energy shortage (Aslam& Muzaffar, 2025b).

Professor Ahmar's research follows a similar pattern in trying to conceive of peace and conflict studies without detracting from the question of sustainable development in Pakistan. In an article, titled Pakistan's developmental failures in the post-colonial framework, Ahmar says that the post-colonial structures of inequality and exclusion that characterized regimes that succeeded colonial governments were significant causes of conflict in the country instead of solving the problem. The colonial legacy of militarized government, ethnic marginalisation from civilian institution authority, notably of Pashtun communities and lack of civilian institutional authority are identified as basic problems by Ahmar. He says that peace is not just the absence of conflict but the presence of functional institutions that provide justice, conflict resolution and fairly distribute resources. Cycling to suppress violence may have a short-term effect in Pakistan, but it cannot calm the political and socio-economic factors which create violence. His approach directly links to SDG 16 by stating that the presence of strong institutions is a necessary but not sufficient condition for peace. Lack of impunity for judges, clear rule of law and civilian oversight of security corps remains only superficial, and these gains can be undone by any new economic or political crisis. Ahmar also takes the international community to task for focusing on Pakistan's role mainly as a security partner, as opposed to a development partner, which has led to the international community's 'short-term mentality' that excludes long-term investment in development institutions. Identify strengths and weaknesses of both studies (Ahmar,2021).

The study by Saeed and colleagues is commendable as they have compiled an exhaustive list of the development challenges in Pakistan in a single digestible study. Remarkably, they have introduced in their list "terrorism" as a parallel to the more conventional development barriers corruption, illiteracy, water scarcity suggest an important intellectual shift; moving security out of its own lane and into the realm of failing development. There is conceptual coherence between the integration and SDG 16 (peace and justice) and SDG 1 (no poverty/health). Ahmar has a deeper voice in theory compared to the rest. Decades of literature on conflict studies and the reality of situations in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa explicated by his argument, peace would not have been possible without proper institutional architecture beyond just the absence of guns, which military operations had cleared over and over without leaving viable civil administration nor legal protection for civilians. It is an important realization that military analysts that have limited close-up experience of Pakistan's counter-terrorism efforts often ignore.

The main methodological drawback in Saeed et al. is his study's dependence on secondary sources which lack critical analysis and scrutiny of the data contained in those secondary sources. Where they use government data and/or UNDP reports, they hardly

question its source, absence of data, or the accuracy of the figures. In addition, Saeed et al. do not sufficiently discuss the structural causes for high fertility rates such as the absence of education, women's empowerment and economic opportunity that they describe as problems. The analysis is circular: illiteracy is caused by poverty, which in turn is caused by overpopulation which is caused by illiteracy. The recommendations found at the end of the study feel like aspirations, not actions to take, because no one indicated what decisions need to be made first. Ahmar's work has a theoretical depth, but it lacks empirical depth. That post-colonial argument is credible on the macro level but can become a bit broad in its implications. Not all the roots and sources of Pakistan's institutional weaknesses can be traced back to the colonial era; many are a result of choices made by the post-colonial civilian and military leaders who could make other decisions. The next point of convergence is in September 2021. The next point of convergence is in September 2021.

However, the issue of system city is highlighted by both studies, with neither resolving this question through short term interventions alone. They both acknowledge that corruption, ineffective governance, and inequality pose not only an obstacle to SDG outcomes, but they are also produced by the political system itself. This convergence is important because there seems to be a link between Pakistan's journey against terror and other governance problems. But, the two studies take different views as to the emphasis on agency. Saeed et al. invariably revolve around Pakistan's government as the main actor of reform, confining the spotlight to elected leaders and policy makers. Unlike Ahmar, the International System-particularly how western nations have been dealing with Pakistan as a security ally instead of as a development partner is where he sees the problem and urges a greater sense of responsibility on their part to respect Pakistan's sovereignty. But unlike Ahmar, says that problem is in the international system, in particular how western countries deal with Pakistan as a security ally and not a development partner, and asks them to exercise more responsibility in this regard, so as to respect its sovereignty. Such a separation is important for policy: domestic governance issues are the root of the problem, hence capacity building within the country is a needed remedy; governance issues are partly related to international incentives, the remedy should also be a change in partnership structures internationally.

The child's relationship with counterterrorism and 16th SDG

From Battleground to Blueprint psychoanalyzes from both articles the very fundamental Western Pakistan has lived with since 9/11 the dichotomy between trying to realize any vision and the political and social conflicts that inevitably arise to cripple the project. The country was put on the international map with huge resources and political backing to wage counter-terrorism but little of it resulted in the development of institutions as required by SDG16. Following APS massacre of 2014 military courts have been constituted, National Action Plan has been stated with twenty points of reform and many operations from Zarb-e-Azb to Rah-e-Nijat have been successful from a tactical military perspective. As both these studies hint, however, these did not yield lasting peace, as would a fully functioning society.

This is the main analytical conclusion: the operational security level of Pakistan has progressed from "battleground" to "degree of operational security" but not "blueprint." There was a lack of institutions for sustainable peace in the form of an independent judiciary, depoliticized military, funded and accountable civil administration in tribal areas throughout the entire span of 2001 to 2020. SDG 16 does not only seek to determine whether a country has overcome the terror, it also asks whether a country has established the institutional network that helps to empower that country to make terror unlikely.

Conclusion

The inadequate anti-Terrorism laws, powerless legal framework and unequal application of accessible laws have been the bone amid most of the arrangement advancements, while there has been a verifiable Need of consistency between Political, Military and Legal tall workplaces of the state. Most Of the time i.e. within the authentic setting, the variables have come about to prevent the Victory of diverse approaches i.e. for both amid the surrounding and usage of the Anti-terrorism policy in Pakistan. Within the light of the over given chronicled realities, this investigate concludes that most of the changes into the anti-terrorism arrangement of Pakistan were brought with political scurry and beneath the weight of the universal powers and Pakistan needed the organization Capacity to actualize the anti-terrorism approach. Assist, the nation needed of an Autonomous centralized -solid sufficient- law authorization apparatus which might have had the capacity for pre-empting and countering the fear-based oppressor plans e.g. in more Productive and coherent manner. It is disastrous that Pakistan could be a nation which is always attempting to adapt with the menace of fear based oppression but still its society and teach are confronting perplexity with respect to the exact definition of "terrorism", because it is very troublesome For them to draw a line between the different customary wrongdoings and the psychological militant exercises. Appropriately, the examination, indictment and the legal offices of the criminal Equity framework of Pakistan is continually confronting issues of assets, capacity and Competence for managing with the previously mentioned danger of fear-based oppression in Pakistan. The progress has been sluggish in Pakistan on this front.

So, the inference is clear: Pakistan's CT operation should not be treated as a battle that can be won but a process which can unfold over years of reconstruction and institutional building. There must follow a civilian administration to every military operation. Plan. There is a need to ensure judicial ability building in all anti-terror legislation. In addition to all economic investment in communities which produce radicalization, of course, to every such crackdown on militant financing there should be a counter-productive economic investment in the community. If these relationships between security and development are absent, then Pakistan cannot avoid falling into the same vicious cycles of violence and insecurity which characterized the first two decades after 9/11.

Recommendations

First of all, Pakistan should take steps towards adopting a comprehensive and strategic plan against terrorism. The following measures can assist in ensuring the success of this objective. For instance, a quality education system which promotes a culture of tolerance, respect for diversity, and critical thinking should be adopted in order to avoid extremism.

Secondly, economic development should also be taken into consideration since poverty often creates conditions in which terrorist groups can exploit individuals who seek employment. Employment and other opportunities should be created for the youth in order to keep them away from joining terrorist groups.

Thirdly, law enforcement and intelligence institutions should be developed using new technologies and training opportunities. Such institutions will contribute greatly to the fight against terrorism since they will be able to prevent terrorist activities.

Fourthly, laws related to the prosecution of terrorist acts must be reformed in order to make sure that there are no biases when cases are being examined. Laws should be applied uniformly to everyone without exceptions. In addition, religious institutions should cooperate with civil society organizations and members of communities in order to counter any form of extremism. Moreover, hate speech and online extremist content should be regulated." check in this

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