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Social Movement Partyism in Authoritarian Regimes: A Case Study of Student Movement against Field Martial Ayub Khan in Pakistan (1968-69)

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PAPER INFO	**ABSTRACT**

The effect of regime type on emergence, development and outcome of social movements has remained the central theme of the political process approach/political opportunity structure. The structural paradigm focused on relative openness or closure of the system, the availability of elite alliances, elite stability or instability, and the repression capacities of the regime in a given political structure. Almedia gave the concept "Social Movement Partyism" which focused on the coalition of social movements and oppositional political parties. Handful research has been done on social movement partyism in democratic settings but there is a vivid gap in the scholarly literature on this very concept in authoritarian regimes.To fill this research gap, this study has drawn evidences from the student movement of 1968-69 in Pakistan against the authoritarian rule of Ayub Khan and examined the movement-parties coalition and its impact on both movement and opposition political parties. In this qualitative case study, the document analysis method has been used to investigate the phenomena under question. The research finds that the movement-party coalition materialized after cost-benefit analysis and has created strategic opportunities for both, movement and oppositional political parties.

Introduction

McAdam and Tarrow (2010, 2013) outlined a research agenda that incorporated electoral politics and social movements. By using the political process approach, scholars have discovered the link between social movements and political parties (Hunter, 2014; Kriesi et al. 2012; Kitschelt, 2006). Often, established oppositional political parties attached themselves with social movements and sometimes social movements turned themselves into political parties. Almeida (2010, 2014) gave the concept of "Social Movement Partyism" which deals with the alignment of opposition political parties with the social movements and provides their organizational base and resources on the disposal of social movement to sustain collective action. In return, the political parties get benefits from this participation, especially in electoral arena of the polity.

The scholars of social movements identified specific dimensions of political system which provides opportunities to start collective action. The democratic institutions provide opportunities, such as institutional openness, prospects of influential allies, relaxation of state coercive tactics, etc. for a movement to emerge (McAdam, 1996). The competitive electoral system in democratic regimes allows the establishment of civic associations (Tilly, 1978) which enhanced the opportunities for social movements to build coalitions. The democratic states usually tolerate the existence of different groups which compete for political power, either through institutional or non-institutional means. The lack of repression in democratic regimes makes the cost low for alliance formation, which in turn allows a more favorable possibility of elite alignment that enhanced the probability of sustained collective action (Bob, 2005). One of the important elite alignments is the political party-social movement alliance which often proves potent for mass contention (Schwartz, 2006).

Handful literature is available on alliance building and partyism in democratic settings. Almeida (2010) argued that sustainable coalition between movement and oppositional parties develops in democratic regimes when the majority of public opinion opposes the regime's economic policies, membership overlap occurs between social movements and political parties, and social movement type organizations.

Less work has been done on social movement partyism in authoritarian settings (Hutter et al. 2018). This paper inspects the relationship between social movements and oppositional political parties in authoritarian regimes. The term 'partyism' is used to describe those oppositional political parties who chose to join the ongoing social movement. Drawing evidences from the student movement of 1968-69 against the authoritarian regime of Field Martial Ayub Khan, this paper examines the conditions under which the political parties decided to join the ongoing social movement. It further explored the benefit of a movement-party coalition and explains the gains achieved by both movement and political parties through social movement partyism in authoritarian settings.

Social Movements and Political Parties

Social Movements are "networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities" (Diani, 1992, p.31). According to Diani's definition, the key concepts of social movements are the presence of informal networks among individuals or groups, solidarity, shared belief, and participation through non-institutionalized means of politics. Sidney Tarrow defines a social movement as, "collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and authorities" (Tarrow, 1994, p.3-4). This definition has four properties: collective challenge, common purpose, solidarity, and sustained interaction among participants.

Political Party is a group of voluntarily organized people who want to acquire political power through institutionalized means. Mudge and Chen (2014), argued that political parties are voluntary organizations that represent and aggregate the interests of citizens to govern a state through electoral success. The parties fought electoral battles with each other to get access to political power.

Charles Tilly in his work "From Mobilization to Revolution" tried to distinguish social movement from a political party. He argued that the social movement consists of challengers who fought through non-institutionalized means to get access to the institutionalized realm while the political party already had access to the institutional decision-making process (Tilly, 1978). Following Tilly's argument, Jenkins and Klandermans labeled the social movement as a potential rival to institutionalized political representation (Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995).

Later, the scholar tried to change this view. Goldstone (2003), in his research article titled "Introduction: Bridging institutionalized and Non-institutionalized politics", argued that the social movement has important elements of normal politics. The boundaries of social movement and political parties are permeable and fuzzy (Goldstone, 2003). Following the lead of Goldstone, Kriesi conceptualized the political parties as part of the political context and argued that movements and political parties are linked with each other beyond an alliance partner. He argued that political parties can become social movements and social movements can turn into political parties to defend their interests in institutional settings (Kriesi, 2015).

The political opportunity structure theorists argue that social movements can expand a specific issue in the general arena by creating controversies if there weren't any, by drawing attention to a specific issue, by framing the grievance as per objectives, and by doing so, the movements create opportunities for elite groups, such as political parties, pressure groups, etc. to join the struggle. The goal of movement participants is to create dissension among the powerful elite (Wolfsfeld, 1997). This creates an opportunity for a movement to forge alliance with political parties to proclaim themselves the champion of people's cause. In return, it enhanced the chances of sustained mobilization in social movements.

Impact of Regime Type on Collective Action

Authoritarian regimes are generally considered monolithic, cohesive, violent, closed, and insular in repressive capacities. Authoritarian regimes differ from each other (Geddes, 1999), that's why scholars gave different accounts for conceptualizing such regimes. Levitsky & Way (2010) defines full authoritarian regimes as those that limit opportunities for challengers to compete legally for political power. In these settings, limited political pluralism is permitted. Civil liberties are not granted and the opposition groups and social movements lack minimal protection. In all cases, authoritarianism is considered a system with highly punitive tendencies toward dissent which resulted in a lack of meaningful political competition (Chen & Snow, 2019).

The authoritarian regimes are marked by a high capacity of repression which generally raises the cost of joining the protest movements. Unlike democratic regimes, the opportunities are either closed or heavily constrained in authoritarianism. Hence, the alliance building in authoritarian regimes risks the cost of repression than incentives, thus it remains a difficult task and has its own cost and reward for both oppositional parties and social movements.

Brief Overview of Student Movement of 1968-69

General Ayub Khan assumed power through martial law in October 1958 after a decade-long instability in Pakistan (Cohen, 2004). All the political parties were banned and there was no access to the formal institutional structure of the state. To consolidate his power, Ayub began to change the socio-political structure of the society. Political activities were banned, and opposition to the regime was curtailed before the introduction of the system of controlled democracy, based on non-partisan lines, via indirect vote (Mahmud, 1993). Through his engineered system of Basic Democracies, Ayub Khan cultivated a new class of localized politicians who proved pawns in the hands of the regime. Furthermore, the martial law regime introduced the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) in August 1959 which strengthened the hands of the authorities to put the bar on the public life of opposition political activists. This notorious law resulted in the retiring of around 6000 political activists till December 31, 1966 (Mahboob, 2017). The system remained closed for the next few years which strengthened the authoritarian military rule of Ayub Khan.

Finally, with the promulgation of the Constitution of 1962, martial law was lifted and the political parties were allowed to work which created an opportunity for political parties to regroup. Opposition political parties formed an electoral alliance in the presidential election of 1965 to nominate joint opposition candidates (Jalal, 2014). The incumbent president defeated Miss Fatima Jinnah comprehensively in an indirect presidential election (Gohar, 1985) which further wrecked the morale of the opposition. The various strategies of the authoritarian regime defeated almost every obstacle for almost ten long years but in November 1968 the students took to the streets and challenged the authoritarian rule of Pakistan's first military dictator.

Ayub regime began to lose power after the war of 1965 (Cheema, 2002). War changed the political landscape (Gohar, 1985) and created backlash for the authoritarian regime (Jalal, 2014). Huge economic disparities, uneven distribution of wealth, rising commodity prices, growing demand for regional autonomy, curbs on freedom developed discontent, and very quickly student movement began to spread all over the country.

On November 7, 1968, the students of Rawalpindi protested against the maltreatment of customs officials with their fellow students. To disperse the students, the police started to baton charge and later opened fire. Abdul Hamid, a first-year student of the polytechnic institute was hit by a bullet and died on the spot (Ali, 2018). The death of a student created a storm of student protest in West Pakistan. The government responded with the closure of educational institutes, among other repressive measures of repression, to deprive students of their mass base.

The death of a 17-year-old student affected almost all urban centers of West Pakistan and a social movement began that demanded an end to Ayub's repressive rule, along with his engineered BD system, and vowed to replace it with parliamentary democracy, based on adult franchise (Jones & O'Donnel, 2012). On November 8, 1968, the government arrested protestors from various urban centers of West Pakistan and declared a curfew in Rawalpindi. Two days later, on November 10, General Ayub Khan was scheduled to address a rally in Peshawar. When he arrived, the audience began to chant anti-Ayub slogans. An assassination attempt

was also made on Ayub by a student by firing two bullets but luckily he survived (Ali, 2018).

Unlike the previous protests, this movement had an ideological appeal that could transcend ethnic, lingual, class, and regional differences (Jafferlot, 2014). The unrest spread dramatically and the government responded with repression and arrest of the student leaders. Seeing an opportunity, the opposition political parties quickly jumped into the movement. The joining of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party and Wali Khan's faction of the National Awami Party enhanced the resource base of social movement and enhanced the protest activity on a large scale. Threatened by these leaders' activities, the government arrested Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Wali Khan on November 13, 1968, under the Defense of Pakistan Regulations. The struggle against the common enemy and the opportunity of enhancing electoral constituency motivated other oppositional political parties of West Pakistan and a group of oppositional political parties, united under the banner of the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) joined the movement (Khan, 2009).

A month later, the movement diffused in East Pakistan, the most populous province, about a thousand miles away from the rest of the country. The Eastern wing of Pakistan was dominated by Sheikh Mujeeb's Awami League and Maolana Bhashani's National Awami Party NAP. Sheikh Mujeeb was in jail after the government leveled charges of sedition against him in the Agartala Conspiracy Case. The tensions were growing in East Pakistan against the Ayub regime on the basis of regional autonomy and uneven distribution of resources. Maulana Bhashani of NAP led the charge against the Ayub regime in 1st week of December and called on a series of strikes against the regime and mobilized the poor working class and peasants to bring the regime down through his tactics of *hartal* and *gherao* (Biswas & Daly, 2021).

In January 1969, leaders of PDM, a coalition formed by Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan to rally anti-Ayub forces, arrived in Dhaka to form an alliance and start a united front in both wings of the country against the authoritarian regime. Awami League and NAP (Bhashani & Muzaffar group) decided to join them and the alliance was renamed as Democratic Action Committee (DAC). Democratic Action Committee demanded an end to Ayub's dictatorial rule, general elections based on adult franchise, a federal parliamentary form of government, and the release of all political leaders & workers, including Sheikh Mujeeb, Bhutto, and Wali Khan (Ali, 2018).

For the first time in the history of Pakistan, both wings decided to launch a united struggle for a common cause. On January 17, 1969, 'Demands Day' was celebrated in both wings of Pakistan and there was a complete strike on the day. It was the first coordinated strike all over the country which rendered all the economic activities to halt. Large demonstrations were carried out in Lahore, Karachi, Rawalpindi, Dhaka, and other major cities of both wings. Police used tear gas and baton charged the participants but all in vain. From that day on, the government started a wave of brutal repression to halt protests. They used traditional methods of arrests, baton charging, and on a few occasions firing at the crowd. From January 24 to January 26, the government brutally used force and killed many protestors (Ali, 2018). In retaliation, an angry mob burnt buses, attacked government offices and fought with security personnel to bring the regime down.

A few days later, on February 1, 1969, President Ayub Khan declared that he is ready to talk to opposition leaders. The Democratic Action Committee put forward some demands as preconditions. They demanded the withdrawal of state of emergency and the release of political leaders from jails (Khan, 2009). The movement continued and violent clashes kept going on in almost all urban centers of Pakistan. The death of the co-accused in the Agartala Conspiracy Case, Zahurul Haq in prison, created a storm in East Pakistan and the government had to impose a curfew. The talks were suspended and the government had to lift the curfew after a few days on February 20. The political prisoners, including Bhutto and Wali Khan, were released. The very next day, Ayub announced that he is going to withdraw from Pakistani politics. On February 22, the Agartala Conspiracy Case was withdrawn and Sheikh Mujeebur Rehman was released from jail (Maniruzzaman, 1971).

Ayub Khan decided to convene Round Table Conference with the leaders of the Democratic Action Committee. The convener of DAC, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan announced that the opposition parties will participate in Round Table Conference, to be held on February 26, 1969. Round Table continued till March 10, 1969, and the opposition agreed on the demand of (i) holding general elections on adult franchise (ii) a federal parliamentary system (iii) autonomy to federating units (Gauhar, 1985).

The round table conference ended in dismay as the lack of consensus on the structure of federal government and measures of regional autonomy couldn't materialize political solution. The conference ended and Ayub Khan, along with the top brass of the military agreed on the point that the deteriorating situation of law and order cannot be controlled without the imposition of Martial Law (Gauhar, 1985). The agitation and violence continued all over the country and finally, on March 25, 1969, the military imposed Martial Law and Ayub's regime came to an end. The new military government restored law and order and held general elections in December 1970, based on adult franchise, for the 1st time in Pakistan.

Conclusion

Authoritarian regimes are monolithic, closed and violent, cohesive and insular in repressive measures to crush the dissent (Chen & Snow, 2019). In these settings, the decision to join a social movement has its consequences and costs & rewards for political parties. Political parties and social movements have different sets of incentives and constraints and the decision to join specific movements is dependent on rational calculation. Political threats and opportunities in authoritarian regimes play a conducive role in social movement-party alliance (Van Dyke, 2003). The parties also lacked favorable access to the routinized structure of state and had left with no other option but resort to protests. The marriage of movement and party materialized when the public opinion turned against the repressive measures of the regime. The excessive use of repressive measures created a backlash and resulted in an erosion of legitimacy which created incentives for political parties to join the movement.

Social movement partyism provides a resource base to the movement. They can instill hope in the movement due to their large organizational structure and mass base. So, the movement party alliance resulted in the widening of the resource base of a social movement. The student movement was provided huge support by

oppositional political parties to sustain collective action and prolong protest activities. They provided de-facto leadership to the movement which channelized its direction. The movement sustained repression, owing to a large scale-shift, largely associated with oppositional political parties. The leftist parties in West Pakistan rallied dissatisfied educated urban middle class along with the poor working class while the parties in East Pakistan managed to incite peasant rebellion along with continual protest by urban classes.

The social movement partyism provides extra leverage to negotiate its terms and conditions with the authorities. The pressure exerted through external agents created a favorable environment for popular contentions and the regime responds to them either with force or with negotiations. Parties are considered to have access to the institutionalized structure (Tilly, 1978), and when the movement reaches a tipping point, the authoritarian regime cannot ignore the protest for so long and repress it with sheer force, as the use of brutal force undermines the legitimacy of the regime and risk radicalization of the movement (Chen & Snow, 2018). Regimes destabilized themselves when the possibility of talk diminished (Goodwin, 2001). Therefore, the Ayub regime initiated talks with the movement leaders and invited opposition political leaders of the movement to Round Table Conferences. The invitation to opposition party leaders indicates that the regime treated them as legitimate contenders and the representative of the movement. The permeable boundaries between political parties and social movement, and the overlapping of membership enabled DAC to hold talks with the regime.

Politicians need reliable popular support to remain relevant in the political arena. The PDM alliance contained experienced political leaders with no mass base. They had among their ranks the former Prime Ministers, and former opposition leaders but had lost appeal after a decade-long authoritarian rule (Kaushik, 1985). With the start of the student movement, PDM, the coalition of oppositional political parties, jumped into the movement to remain relevant in changing political scenarios.

Political parties used to fight electoral battles to gain access to political power through institutionalized means. To broaden their electoral support, the opposition political parties aligned themselves with the ongoing social movements. Ayub's second presidential term was about to end and the election for the presidency was around the corner. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People's Party had openly expressed his candidature for the upcoming presidential election. He was on his public speaking tour when the movement broke up against Ayub Khan. The Bhutto-led PPP quickly jumped into the movement which maximized its vote bank and emerged as the largest party in West Pakistan in 1970's polls (Mujahid, 1971). The other main oppositional party of West Pakistan, Wali Khan's faction of NAP also maximized its electoral constituency and gained reasonable seats in NFWP and Baluchistan (Rizwan, 2014). The Awami League emerged as the victorious party after its landslide victory in the general elections of 1970 (Baxter, 1971).

Some political parties decided to join a movement for a specific policy-seeking agenda. When the regional parties had souring relations with the center, they often lack bargaining resources, which forces them to resort to protests (Chen & Snow, 2018). Marches, processions and strikes are used as a means to exert pressure on the central government to reallocate resources and attention to the propagated cause

(Robertson, 2007). The Mujeeb's Awami League and Bhashani's NAP propagated the agenda of regional autonomy and participated in protest cycles to advance their claims (Sobhan, 1969). These parties remain successful in highlighting the issue of regional autonomy throughout the movement. The parties remain able to create a soft corner in West Pakistan regarding their policy-seeking agenda and managed to table it in Round Table Conferences (Gauhar, 1985).

And last, the overlapping membership, organizational structure, and shared de-facto leaders of the movement play a key role in the movement-party alliance. Important leaders and political activists who are part of oppositional political parties and also a participant of a social movement act as brokers and bring the movement closer to the oppositional political parties (Mische, 2008). The progressive students, who led the movement at the initial phases, were aligned with the oppositional political parties. The Student Action Committee was aligned with the East Pakistan oppositional political parties (Maniruzzaman, 1971). The movement and party had shared the same de-facto leadership which resulted in the overlapping of membership and the social movement partyism remained successful during the student movement of 1968-69 in Pakistan.

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