



RESEARCH PAPER

Decentralization and Subnational Politics: Investigating the Impact of Democratic Decentralization on Subnational Politics in Pakistan

Muhammad Mushtaq¹ Adil Zaman*²

1. Associate Professor, Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of Gujrat, Punjab, Pakistan
2. Lecturer, Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of Gujrat, Punjab, Pakistan, adil.zaman@uog.edu.pk

Note: The Higher Education Commission (HEC) of Pakistan funded this research through the National Research Program for Universities (NRPU) Project No. 9300, titled "Decentralization, Subnational Politics, and Democratic Transition in Pakistan (2010-17)."

DOI

[http://doi.org/10.47205/plhr.2022\(6-III\)45](http://doi.org/10.47205/plhr.2022(6-III)45)

ABSTRACT

This study seeks to assess the impact of decentralization on subnational politics in Pakistan through the lens of public opinion. This quantitative study makes use of data from a national survey that was stratified by region, language, age, and gender. According to statistical analysis, decentralization has made a significant contribution to subnational politics in Pakistan. The study finds that the 18th constitutional amendment has advanced decentralization in Pakistan which has strengthened self-rule, improved subnational governance, and enhanced political participation among the masses in Pakistan. This decentralization has addressed issues related to identity politics and power-sharing as well. The results also indicate that decentralization and the related outcomes in the form of self-rule, governance, political participation, and identity politics have also pushed democratic and federal stability in Pakistan. Based on its findings, this paper contends that decentralization is the best solution for bringing democratic stability and good governance in Pakistan.

Keywords

Decentralization, Federal Stability, Pakistan, Subnational Politics

Introduction

Since the turn of the last century, social scientists have noticed a widespread international trend toward decentralization. This decentralization has sparked a great deal of scholarly interest and has produced enormous literature that examines the nature, impact, and role of decentralization in different places (Sorens, 2009; Vlahos, 2020; Moreno, 2002; Palermo & Wilson, 2014; Hlepas, et al., 2018); Baicker et al., 2012; Basta, 2018; Lecours, 2019; Smoke et al., 2006; Crook & Manor, 1998; Erk, 2014; Fombad, 2018). However, little attention has been paid to examining how decentralization contributes to subnational politics in multilevel settings (Falleti, 2010; Rodríguez, 2021; Shair-Rosenfield, 2021). Decentralization has significantly changed the role of governments and the nature of politics by increasing subnational revenues and expenditures, transferring major public services such as education, health, housing, transportation, and poverty alleviation programs to subnational governments, and reforming relations between different levels of government and subnational regions (Falleti, 2010, p. 1-2). However, depending on the nature of

society, political system, degree of decentralization, and state of democracy, the effects of decentralization on subnational politics varied greatly across cases.

Federations espouse decentralization and assign substantial powers to the units to design and execute public policies at subnational levels. However, the level of autonomy and scope of responsibilities of the regions varies across the federations. Decentralization is also evident in many non-federal states, with the United Kingdom serving as the most prominent example. Despite being a federation, Pakistan has historically adopted a centralized system. However, the 18th constitutional amendment adopted in 2010 provided sufficient autonomy and devolved many powers to its federating units.

This study examines the effects of decentralization and provincial autonomy granted to the provinces through the 18th Constitutional Amendment on the subnational politics in Pakistan and how it is going to contribute to Pakistan's democratic transition. There is an abundance of scholarly work on the 18th amendment, decentralization, and provincial autonomy in Pakistan (Adeney, 2012; Ahmad, 2010; Hussain, 2012; Khalid, 2020; Mahmood, 2013; Musarrat, Ali, & Azhar, 2012; Shah, 2012) but there is no study available on the interplay of decentralization, provincial autonomy, and subnational politics in Pakistan in the post 18th amendment scenario. The current study fills that gap by focusing not only on the effectiveness of the 18th amendment for decentralization but its impact on the nature of subnational politics in terms of self-rule, governance, political participation, and, identity politics. Equally this study intends to contribute an original analysis to fill this gap in the existing literature on such an important theme.

The analysis of this study is based on the findings of a national survey of public opinion. A representative sample was carefully chosen keeping in view the diversity of Pakistani society. A structured questionnaire was designed to gather public opinion. The questionnaire included questions related to the demographic information of the interviewees. A set of questions were incorporated into the questionnaire to determine the impact of decentralization on certain variables such as self-rule, governance, political participation, identity politics, and federal and democratic stability. SPSS was used for the analysis of this study. The survey results suggest that decentralization in Pakistan has an impact on self-rule, governance, political participation, and identity politics. Decentralization and its claimed impacts also affect Pakistan's democratic and federal stability. The statistical analyses suggest that these impacts/variables are interconnected, which in turn is connected to Pakistan's democratic and federal stability

Democratic Decentralization and 18th Constitutional Amendment in Pakistan

Historically, the Pakistani state has experienced centralized governance. Although all constitutions (1956, 1962, and 1973) divided powers between the federation and provinces, provinces were given limited autonomy. Similarly, the provinces were given meager financial resources. As a result, smaller provinces have advocated for greater autonomy and fiscal resources. Finally, the federation passed the 18th constitutional amendment in 2010. The concurrent legislative list was abolished, and several ministries were devolved as a result of this amendment (See, Table 1).

Table 1
Ministries Abolished after the 18th amendment

Sr. No.	Ministries	Sr. No.	Ministries
1	Food and Agriculture	10	Livestock and Dairy
2	Health	11	Labor and Manpower
3	Education	12	Minorities
4	Social Welfare and Special Education	13	Tourism
5	Population Welfare	14	Women development
6	Youth Affairs	15	Special initiatives
7	Environment	16	Local government & Rural Development
8	Sports	17	Zakat and Usher
9	Culture		

Source: Shah, A. 2012: 397

Similarly, the federation revised the formula used by the National Finance Commission to distribute funds between the federation and provinces. Provinces were given adequate funds in the revised NFC Award, and the share of smaller provinces was increased (See, Table 2). The table shows that Balochistan's share has significantly increased. Because of the increase in Balochistan's share, the government was able to offer the multi-dimensional Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan package. This project is a combination of "political, administrative, and economic initiatives by the federal government aimed at addressing longstanding grievances of the province" (Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan package, 2009).

Table 2
Allocation shares to provinces under NFC Awards (%)

Province	2006	2010	Difference between 2006 and 2010	Size of population-to-share in funds ratio (2010)
Punjab	57.36	51.74	-5.62	1: 0.90
Sindh	23.71	24.55	0.84	1: 1.04
KP	13.82	14.62	0.8	1: 1.06
Balochistan	5.11	9.09	3.98	1: 1.78
Total	100	100	0	

Source: <https://finance.gos.pk/ResourceDistribution/NFC>; and calculations borrowed from Mushtaq & Zahra, 2022.

This legislative, administrative, and fiscal decentralization has reformed the federal governance in Pakistan. This democratic decentralization has attracted enormous scholarly attention and sufficient scholarship is available that examines the impact of this decentralization on the federal and subnational governance in Pakistan (Adeney, 2012; Mushtaq, 2016; Arshad, Chawla, & Zia, 2018; Ahmed, 2013; Shah, 2012; Khan, 2021; Ali & Mufti, 2022). However, this is the first study that examines this impact through the lens of public perspective.

Decentralization and Subnational Politics: Review of literature and hypotheses development

Boko (2002) in his study on "*Decentralization: Definitions, Theories, and Debate*" argues that decentralization grants authority to the units in matters related to

administrative, political, financial, and economic aspects. Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Roberto Ezcurra (2010) have investigated the connection between political and fiscal decentralization and the growth of regional inequality in both developed and developing societies. According to the findings, decentralization has been associated with a decrease in regional inequality in high-income countries but a significant increase in it in low- and middle-income countries. Leonel Muinelo-Gallo, Oriol Roca-Sagalés, and Andreas P. Kyriacou (2015) investigated how the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional disparities is affected by institutional quality. They discovered that countries with high-quality institutions can benefit more from fiscal decentralization for regional development. Giving sub-national governments more fiscal authority in developing societies with poor governance, on the other hand, is likely to widen the income disparity between regions. This review of the literature suggests how decentralization contributes to good governance, but the results are mixed.

Brancati (2006) in his article "*Decentralization: Fueling the fire or dampening the flames of ethnic conflict and secessionism?*" elaborates that decentralization has managed the diversity in a society with many different cultures and ethnicities to solve their underlying issues at the regional and sub-national level. The major outcome of decentralization and division of power is that it helps to reduce ethnic and sub-nationalistic conflicts by helping out political participation and role in policymaking which leads to a stronger subnational autonomy. Treisman Daniel (2007) in his book "*The architecture of government: Rethinking political decentralization*" argues that after the devolution of power the subnational politics and local government have greater autonomy to set the tax rate and fiscal expenditures. The fiscal decentralization done at the central level leads to stronger and better tax policies and the financial expenditures are done in a way that promotes economic activity at the sub-national level. The decentralization at the sub-national level helps in making better policies for the subnational regions because of the involvement of local and regional officials who have a greater idea about the ground situation.

Several factors influence how decentralization contributes to the empowerment of society's underprivileged groups. Empowerment, it is said, focuses on the elimination of socioeconomic and political barriers through the transformation and distribution of power among governments, institutions, and people. However, the central government's decentralized policies, the institutional and managerial capacities of local or regional governments, and the local political power structure all influence the effectiveness and quality of decentralization in terms of empowerment (Uddin, 2017). Emanuele Massetti and Arjan H Schakel (2017) in their study "*Decentralization Reforms and Regionalist Parties' Strength: Accommodation, Empowerment or Both?*" examines the impact of decentralization on regional political parties' strength at subnational and national level elections. They believe that decentralization directly affects the number of regional political parties, and it also establishes the process of proliferation and diffusion.

The impact of decentralization on political participation has been investigated by many scholars. It has been argued that decentralization increases the number of chances for citizen participation in decision-making by bringing the government closer to the people. Due to this tendency, political engagement is increased, and under decentralized systems as opposed to centralized ones, people are reported to be more eager about participating in politics. People in modern democracies elect their leaders and hold them accountable and responsive through voting. As a result, voting is an essential component of democracy and has a substantial impact on the

success or failure of democracy. Higher voter turnout is expected to be a sign of political and democratic stability, while low voter turnout is seen to be an indicator of weak democracies. The literature on decentralization suggests that it enhances voter turnout and political participation. It is argued that the "literature on the consequences of decentralization has demonstrated a positive effect on voter participation in subnational elections" (Stoyan & Niedzwiecki, 2018).

Federalism guarantees self-government by granting autonomy in specific areas and decentralizing authority and resources to the federating units. There are differing views, however, on the impact of this provision for self-rule or decentralization on identity politics. Some argue that decentralization increases autonomy demands and fosters centrifugal sentiments in regional identities. Others argue that self-rule results in power-sharing, which nurtures a sense of ownership among marginalized groups and contributes to national unity and political stability. The literature on federalism has investigated how self-rule accommodates diversity and how it exacerbates ethnic differences (Erk & Anderson, 2009). It has been stated that, despite implementing decentralization, Spain has witnessed numerous pro-independence organizations and increased support for independence in Catalonia (Anderson, 2020). On the other hand, it is claimed that decentralization has worked well even in the absence of formal federal constitutions to manage diversity in certain places such as Indonesia and Philippines, and Singapore. Building on this evidence, Francis Kok Wah Loh (2017) has argued for decentralizing power and resources.

Dan Miodownik and Britt Cartrite (2010) investigated "does political decentralization exacerbate or ameliorate ethnopolitical mobilization?", they discovered that the impact of decentralization on ethnopolitical mobilization is nonlinear. They argue that while "weak and medium levels of decentralization increase the likelihood of ethnopolitical mobilization, the strong decentralization decreases it".

Building on this review of literature, this study develops the following hypotheses to investigate how decentralization has contributed to subnational politics in Pakistan by improving self-rule, and governance, increasing political participation, addressing identity-based grievances, and ultimately strengthening democratic and federal rule.

- H1: Decentralization enables regions to exercise self-rule.
- H2: Decentralization improves governance at the subnational level.
- H3: Decentralization enhances political participation at the subnational level.
- H4: Decentralization generates new debates concerning identity politics at the subnational level.
- H5: Decentralization strengthens democratic and federal stability.
- H6: Self-Rule in the regions is a positive step toward democratic federalism
- H7: Governance at subnational positively affects the democratic federalism
- H8: Political participation positively impacts democratic federalism in Pakistan

Concerning self-rule as a variable, this paper investigates how the decentralization granted by the 18th amendment has endowed provinces with self-rule in the social sectors such as education and health, as well as fiscal authority. The perception of respondents about the impact of decentralization on self-rule is determined by asking some relevant questions. These questions determine the extent to which respondents believe that after the decentralization provincial governments are autonomous in developing educational policies; authorized in developing health policies; satisfied with the financial resources provided to them; satisfied with the quantum of autonomy provided to them; and exercising autonomy within their respective provinces.

In the context of governance, the perception of respondents determines the impact of decentralization on governance at a provincial level in Pakistan. These factors determine the extent to which respondents believe that following the decentralization, governance at the provincial level has improved; decision-making has become more inclusive; provincial governments have become more efficient; governments appear to be more responsive to local needs, and intra-provincial socioeconomic inequalities have been addressed. Concerning political participation, this study investigates the perception of respondents to determine the impact of decentralization on political participation. These factors determine the extent to which respondents believe that decentralization has increased public interest in electoral politics; caused an increase in voter turnout in elections; empowered previously under-represented groups; and made it easier for citizens to influence public policy.

Similarly, regarding identity politics, this study investigates the impact of decentralization on identity politics and regional demands in Pakistan. The perception of respondents about the four factors listed below determines the impact of decentralization on identity politics. These factors determine the extent to which respondents believe that, following decentralization, provincial minorities are advocating more vigorously to address intra-provincial disparities; provincial minorities are advocating more forcefully for the creation of new provinces; ethno-regional parties have gained more electoral support, and the process of national integration has been strengthened. Reference to democratic federalism, a set of questions is developed based on the literature review to establish how decentralization has contributed to federal and democratic stability in Pakistan. The perception of respondents about the impact of decentralization on democratic and federal stability in Pakistan was determined by assessing how much the respondents believe that decentralization has strengthened representative democracy; maintained political stability; introduced inclusive governance; contributed to democratic stability; and improved center-province relations.

Materials and Methods

The data for this paper comes from a survey of public opinion. To ensure a representative sample, it was stratified by province, language, gender, and age. Although random sampling was adopted, the target population was people having some background knowledge about federalism and decentralization in Pakistan. To ensure the survey's response rate and whether respondents understand the survey questions, a pilot survey was carried out well before the actual survey. Following the pilot study with 10% of the respondents, the field staff was trained. The questionnaire was translated into Urdu. The response rate was 87.5 percent, with 2100 out of 2400 questionnaires returned and 2041 deemed suitable for analysis.

The majority (68%) of the respondents were male. In a traditional society like Pakistan, it's difficult to maintain gender balance among respondents. People from all regions of Pakistan were interviewed. The majority of the respondents are below the age of 45. The demographic information of the respondents is illustrated in the following table.

Table 3
Gender versus Region distribution of the data

	Gender		Total
	Male f (%)	Female f (%)	f (%)
Balochistan	142(7.0)	48(2.4)	190(9.3)
Islamabad	48(2.4)	32(1.6)	80(3.9)
KP	264(12.9)	98(4.8)	362(17.7)
Punjab	605(29.6)	334(16.4)	939(46.0)
Sindh	338(16.6)	132(6.5)	470(23.0)
	1397(68.4)	644(31.6)	2041(100.0)

Before applying the required statistical tests, the data were tested for statistical reliability. The value of Cronbach Alfa in the following table 4 confirmed that data is statistically reliable for statistical analysis.

Table 4
Reliability Test

S. No.	Variable name	Variable Code	Items	Cronbach Alfa
I	Decentralization	DECE	10	.801
	Self-Rule	SERU	5	.654
ii	Governance	GOVE	6	.810
	Political Participation	POPA	4	.696
	Identity Politics	IDPO	5	.606
iii	Democratic Federalism	DEFE	6	.778
	Total		36	.895

Similarly, the normality test (Table 5) demonstrates that data is not normally distributed hence non-parametric tests are suitable to be conducted for further analysis.

Table 5
Tests of Normality

	Kolmogorov-Smirnova			Shapiro-Wilk		
	Statistic	df	Sig.	Statistic	df	Sig.
Decentralization	.083	2041	.000	.978	2041	.000
Self-Rule	.083	2041	.000	.986	2041	.000
Governance	.072	2041	.000	.986	2041	.000
Political Participation	.092	2041	.000	.980	2041	.000
Identity Politics	.079	2041	.000	.988	2041	.000
Democratic Federalism	.081	2041	.000	.982	2041	.000

The study has adopted a quantitative positivist approach. SPSS software is used to analyze data. An analytical approach is adopted to link results with contemporary literature.

Results and Discussion

Tau_b correlation, Chi-Square, and Regression analysis statistical tests are conducted to verify the hypothesis of the study. The tests confirm the correlation and association of the variables. The tests thus assert the statistically significant influence of decentralization for self-rule, governance, political participation, and identity politics in provinces as well as for democratic federalism in Pakistan.

The decentralization is significantly correlated with self-rule, governance, political participation, identity politics, and democratic federalism in Pakistan (Table 4). The highest value is with self-rule followed by democratic federalism which substantiates that decentralization is a positive addition to self-rule that will eventually lead to democratic and federal stability.

The results in Table 6 also show that among other factors, it is self-rule that strongly affects governance in provinces. The governance inside provinces influences political participation and democratic and federal stability. Likewise, political participation influences democratic and federal stability significantly. While decentralization strongly affects self-rule, it is political participation that has a strong correlation with democratic and federal stability among all the variables followed by governance and identity politics.

Table 6
Tau b Correlations between Each Factor

	DECE	SERU	GOVE	POPA	IDPO	DEFE
DECE	1	.302**	.188**	.184**	.199**	.277**
SERU		1	.331**	.234**	.219**	.247**
GOVE			1	.414**	.303**	.380**
POPA				1	.328**	.396**
IDPO					1	.358**
DEFE						1

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Similarly, the chi-square statistical test (Table 7) also presents similar results. Taking democratic federalism as the dependent variable, almost all the variables have a statistically significant association with democratic and federal stability. We can state that democratic and federal stability is dependent on decentralization and its other variables.

Table 7
Chi-square Statistical Test (Dependent Variable= Democratic Federalism)

S. No.	Independent variable	Chi-square Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
i	Decentralization	2434.344	888	.000
ii	Self-Rule	1777.869	480	.000
iii	Governance	2566.715	576	.000
iv	Political Participation	1818.678	384	.000
v	Identity Politics	2254.982	480	.000

Total Number of Observations =2041

The regression analysis in Table 8 also depicts that decentralization, governance, political participation, and identity politics are statistically significantly correlated with democratic federalism while self-rule is insignificantly correlated with a p-value greater than the required threshold.

Table 8
Linear regression analysis predicting democratic federalism
(parameter estimates and standard error)

Predictor	Unstandardized		Standardized	t	Sig.
	Coefficients		Coefficients		
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	1.301	.535		2.430	.015
Decentralization	.148	.014	.203	10.885	.000
Self-Rule	-.009	.025	-.007	-.359	.720
Governance	.233	.020	.251	11.738	.000
Political Participation	.349	.029	.249	11.857	.000
Identity Politics	.274	.026	.206	10.566	.000

a. Dependent Variable: Democratic Federalism

b. R=.660, R Square= .436, Adjusted R Square=.435, df=5, F=314.929, Sig.=.000

The hypotheses are discussed in the following section.

- **Hypothesis 1:** Decentralization enables regions to exercise self-rule: Table 4 shows that decentralization is correlated with self-rule with a value of .302 with a p-value of .000. The result thus shows that decentralization in the country in the wake of the 18th constitutional amendment enhanced the capacity of the provinces to exercise self-rule.
- **Hypothesis 2:** Decentralization improves governance at the subnational level: The data in table 4 asserts that decentralization is also correlated with governance through a coefficient value of .188 with a p-value of .000 which confirms that there is a significant correlation between decentralization and governance. The hypothesis argues that decentralization is a positive development towards governance in the provinces.
- **Hypothesis 3:** Decentralization enhances political participation at the subnational level: The data in table 4 demonstrate that decentralization is correlated with political participation in provinces through a coefficient value of .184 which confirms that there is a significant correlation between decentralization and political participation. The research hypothesis asserts that decentralization has enhanced political participation in the provinces.
- **Hypothesis 4:** Decentralization generates new debates concerning identity politics at the subnational level: The data in table 4 asserts that decentralization is also correlated with identity politics through a coefficient value of .199 which confirms that there is a significant correlation between decentralization and identity politics. The hypothesis confirms that decentralization has given rise to a new debate on identity politics in provinces. The Hazara movement in KP province and the Saraiki movement in Punjab also point towards that in the aftermath of the 18th amendment.

- **Hypothesis 5:** Decentralization strengthens democratic and federal stability: The data in table 4 demonstrate that decentralization is correlated with democratic federalism in Pakistan through a coefficient value of .277 which confirms that there is a significant correlation between decentralization and democratic federalism in Pakistan. Results in Tables 5 and 6 also maintain that decentralization is significantly associated with democratic federalism. The hypothesis thus demonstrates that decentralization has paved way for a more inclusionary system that has strengthened democratic federalism in Pakistan by enhancing self-rule, governance, political participation, and identity politics in the regions.
- **Hypothesis 6:** Self-Rule in the regions is a positive step towards democratic federalism: The result in table 4 demonstrates that self-rule is correlated with democratic federalism with a coefficient value of .247 which confirms the significant association between both. Results in Table 5 also upheld that self-rule is significantly associated with democratic federalism, while regression analysis in Table 6 predicts that self-rule is negatively and insignificantly associated with democratic federalism. The results denote that there exists association but futuristically predict that self-rule will further lead to weak federalism.
- **Hypothesis 7:** Governance in the regions positively affects democratic federalism: The data in table 4 demonstrate that governance is significantly correlated with democratic federalism in Pakistan through a coefficient value of .380 that confirms that there is a significant correlation between both. Results in Tables 5 and 6 also maintain that governance is significantly associated with democratic federalism. The hypothesis verifies that governance in the aftermath of the 18th constitutional amendment has improved and become efficient which has strengthened democratic federalism in Pakistan.
- **Hypothesis 8:** Political participation positively impacts democratic federalism in Pakistan: The data in table 4 demonstrate that political participation is significantly associated with democratic federalism in Pakistan with a coefficient value of .396 which confirms that there is a significant association between both. Results in Tables 5 and 6 also denote that political participation is significantly associated with democratic federalism. The hypothesis thus demonstrates that political participation has increased which has strengthened democratic federalism in Pakistan.

The results demonstrate that the 18th constitutional amendment is a welcoming step towards decentralization in Pakistan. Similarly, decentralization has significantly enhanced the capacity of the provinces in Pakistan to self-rule and effectiveness in governance. Decentralization has also enhanced political participation in provincial politics by effectively engaging the old and new political actors and parties. Similarly, based on the results, it is stated that decentralization and the related outcomes have given rise to a new debate of regional and identity politics inside provinces. The results also indicate that decentralization and the related outcomes in the form of self-rule, governance, political participation, and identity politics have also pushed democratic stability in Pakistan.

Conclusion

Historically, the Pakistani state has experienced centralized federal governance. However, the federation adopted the 18th constitutional amendment in

2010 and provided many powers to the provinces. In this context, this study has investigated the effects of this decentralization and provincial autonomy on the sub-national politics in Pakistan and how it has contributed to Pakistan's democratic transition. This study used the data collected through a survey of public opinion. The analysis of data suggests that decentralization in Pakistan considerably affects self-rule, efficiency in governance, the rise in political participation, and smooth identity politics. At the same time, decentralization and its stated effects have contributed to democratic and federal stability in Pakistan. The study finds that the 18th constitutional amendment has advanced decentralization in Pakistan which has further enhanced self-rule, good governance, and political participation among the masses at the subnational level in Pakistan. The study also finds that decentralization, the resultant self-rule, good governance, political participation among the masses, and identity politics in the province have also espoused democratic and federal stability in Pakistan.

References

- Adeney, K. (2012). A step towards inclusive federalism in Pakistan? The politics of the 18th amendment. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 42(4), 539-565.
- Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan package*. (2009, December 03). The Business Recorder.
- Ahmad, R. (2010). The Endemic Crisis of Federalism in Pakistan. *The Lahore Journal of Economics*, 15(SE), 15-31.
- Ahmed, S. J. (2013). Historical Evolution of Federalism in Pakistan: From Bewilderment to Setting up of a Path. *Pakistan Perspective*, 18(2), 11-29.
- Ali, S. A. M., & Mufti, M. (2022). Political Parties and Decentralization in Pakistan. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 52(2), 201-224.
- Arshad, F., Chawla, M. I., & Zia, A. (2018). Re-contextualizing the 18th Amendment: Working of Federalism in Pakistan. *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, 55(2), 25-35.
- Anderson, P. (2020). Decentralization at a crossroads: Spain, Catalonia, and the territorial crisis. *Ethnopolitics*, 19(4), 342-355.
- Arshad, F., Chawla, M. I., & Zia, A. (2018). Re-contextualizing the 18th Amendment: Working of Federalism in Pakistan. *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, 55(2), 25-35.
- Baicker, K., Clemens, J., & Singhal, M. (2012). The rise of the states: US fiscal decentralization in the postwar period. *Journal of Public Economics*, 96(11-12), 1079-1091.
- Boko, S. H. (2002). Decentralization: Definitions, Theories, and Debate. In *Decentralization and Reform in Africa* (pp. 1-10). Springer.
- Brancati, D. (2006). Decentralization: Fueling the fire or dampening the flames of ethnic conflict and secessionism? *International organization*, 60(3), 651-685.
- Crook, R. C., Crook, R. C., & Manor, J. (1998). *Democracy and decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, accountability and performance*. Cambridge University Press.
- Erk, J. (2014). Federalism and decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Five patterns of evolution. *Regional & Federal Studies*, 24(5), 535-552.
- Erk, J., & Anderson, L. (2009). The paradox of federalism: does self-rule accommodate or exacerbate ethnic divisions? *Regional & Federal Studies*, 19(2), 191-202.
- Falleti, T. G. (2010). *Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Fombad, C. M. (2018). Constitutional entrenchment of decentralization in Africa: An overview of trends and tendencies. *Journal of African Law*, 62(2), 175-199.

- Hlepas, N. K., Kersting, N., Kuhlmann, S., Swianiewicz, P., & Teles, F. (Eds.). (2018). Sub-municipal governance in Europe: Decentralization beyond the municipal tier. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hussain, M., & Kokab, R. U. (2012). Eighteenth amendment in the constitution of Pakistan: Success and controversies. *Asian Social Science*, 8(1), 81-88.
- Keating, M. (2001). *The dynamics of decentralization: Canadian federalism and British devolution*. T. C. Salmon (Ed.). McGill-Queen's University Press; Lecours, A. (2019). Dynamic de/centralization in Canada, 1867-2010. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 49(1), 57-83.
- Khalid, I. (2013). Politics of Federalism in Pakistan: Problems and Prospects. *South Asian Studies*, 28(1), 199-212.
- Khan, I. (2021). Fiscal Federalism in Pakistan: A Study of National Finance Commission Award. *Global Media and Social Sciences Research Journal (GMSSR)*, 2(2), 70-78.
- Kyriacou, A. P., Muineló-Gallo, L., & Roca-Sagalés, O. (2015). Fiscal decentralization and regional disparities: The importance of good governance. *Papers in Regional Science*, 94(1), 89-107.
- Loh, F. K. W. (2017). Ethnic diversity and the nation-state: from centralization in the age of nationalism to decentralization amidst globalization. *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 18(3), 414-432.
- Mahmood, A. (2013). Regional political parties: challenge to political stability of Pakistan. *Pakistan Vision*, 15(2), 17-27.
- Masseti, E., & Schakel, A. H. (2017). Decentralisation reforms and regionalist parties' strength: Accommodation, empowerment or both?. *Political Studies*, 65(2), 432-451.
- Miodownik, D., & Cartrite, B. (2010). Does political decentralization exacerbate or ameliorate ethnopolitical mobilization? A test of contesting propositions. *Political Research Quarterly*, 63(4), 731-746.
- Moreno, L. (2002). Decentralization in Spain. *Regional Studies*, 36(4), 399-408.
- Musarrat, R., Ali, G., & Azhar, M. S. (2012). 18th Amendment and its Impacts on Pakistan's Politics. *Journal of Sociological Research*, 3(1), 1-7.
- Mushtaq, M. (2016). Managing Ethnic Diversity: The Pakistani Experience. In S. N. Romaniuk, & M. Marlin, *Democracy and Civil Society in a Global Era* (pp. 86-102). New York: Routledge.
- Mushtaq, M., & Mirza, Z. S. (2022). Understanding the Nexus Between Horizontal Inequalities, Ethno-Political Conflict and Political Participation: A Case Study of Balochistan. *Ethnopolitics*, 21(3), 221-237.
- Palermo, F., & Wilson, A. (2014). The multi-level dynamics of state decentralization in Italy. *Comparative European Politics*, 12(4), 510-530.

- Rodríguez, R. A. P. (2021). Decentralization and subnational politics in North America. *Handbook on Decentralization, Devolution and the State*; Gray, C., Turner, E., & Vampa, D. (2021). Decentralization and subnational politics in Western Europe. In *Handbook on Decentralization, Devolution and the State* (pp. 171-195). Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Rodríguez-Pose, A., & Ezcurra, R. (2010). Does decentralization matter for regional disparities? A cross-country analysis. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 10(5), 619-644.
- Routledge; Basta, K. (2018). The state between minority and majority nationalism: Decentralization, symbolic recognition, and secessionist crises in Spain and Canada. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 48(1), 51-75.
- Shah, A. (2012). The 18th constitutional amendment: glue or solvent for nation-building and citizenship in Pakistan? *The Lahore Journal of Economics*, 17(SE), 387-424
- Shair-Rosenfield, S. (2021). Decentralization and subnational politics in Asia. In *Handbook on Decentralization, Devolution and the State* (pp. 131-146). Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Smoke, P. J., Eduardo, J. G., & Peterson, G. E. (Eds.). (2006). *Decentralization in Asia and Latin America: towards a comparative interdisciplinary perspective*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Sorens, J. (2009). The partisan logic of decentralization in Europe. *Regional & Federal Studies*, 19(2), 255-272.
- Stoyan, A. T., & Niedzwiecki, S. (2018). Decentralization and democratic participation: The effect of subnational self-rule on voting in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Electoral Studies*, 52, 26-35.
- Treisman, D. (2007). *The architecture of government: Rethinking political decentralization*. Cambridge University Press.
- Uddin, N. (2017). Empowerment through decentralization: conceptions, contrivances, and connections. *Dynamics of Public Administration*, 34(1), 86-101.
- Vlahos, N. (2020). The politics of subnational decentralization in France, Brazil, and Italy. *Journal of Deliberative Democracy*, 9(2), 1-27.
doi: <https://doi.org/10.16997/jdd.171>