



RESEARCH PAPER

Relations between the United States and Iran under the Presidency of Mahmud Ahmadinejad

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ABSTRACT

This study examines how the shifting dynamics of geopolitical circumstances have impacted US-Iran relations to defend their national interests and regional dominance. The US strategy towards Iran has been focused on achieving non-proliferation goals and ending Iranian support of armed forces in the Israel-Arab conflict, which used violence to support Palestine's cause. Throughout the 2000s, Iran was labeled as an "axis of the evil state." However, the Obama administration has been actively encouraging talks between the US and Iran to lessen tensions between the two countries. Under the administration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, relations between the United States and Iran centered on a change in the regional and global balance of power and alliances, highlighted the two countries desire for mutual security through a variety of measures and continued to focus on the core vital goals in the regional set-up.

KEYWORDS Axis of Evil, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Islamic Revolution, Middle East, Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Introduction

Iran has remained to be power in the Middle East. With the region's second-largest population and economy, it has great economic potential. Iran is also an active foreign policy actor currently involved in some of the Middle East's most significant conflicts, such as Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. It has been a historical and longstanding desire of the Iranian people and its leaders that their country attains a role defined by independence and national sovereignty; instead, it has continued to be cast into national roles of inferiority, first by European powers and then by the United States (Kerr, 2009). The US-Iran domestic factors affect Iran's nuclear policy, which may challenge the nuclear deal's implementation. The 15-year implementation process is likely to be affected by the state-centric constitution of Iran, which leaves no room for foreign and, in particular western considerations, and by the U.S. Republican fears relating to the security of the state of Israel (Dumbrell, 2007). The Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988 was the last political war. Iran has fought to date with simple consequences for the country, proving the double function of war in the society of states. It presented a complaint while, at the same time, it functioned as an instrument of Iran's state policy. With Iran's eight-year war and the military interference of the United States in adjoining Iraq and Afghanistan, there is good reason for the Iranian management to take the danger of war in the U.S. administration rhetoric very seriously (Kerr, 2009).

Since the 1979 revolution, the United States has needed help identifying Iran's Islamic command. Iran being a self-governing state and a member of the international society, definitely supposed this was a threat to their power and territorial integrity as the government needed to be more mutually familiar as the independent entity in Iran. The consequences of such insecurity have surely prejudiced Iran's foreign policy, especially in seeking recognition. Nevertheless, there are signs that through the paramilitary Hezbollah

group, Iran has somehow involved itself indirectly with the establishment of war, notwithstanding its paranoia about the institution's attractiveness. This is partly due to the perceived security threats and the uncertainties of needing to be fully recognized as a sovereign nation-state by the United States. From Bush's Axis of Evil speech until 2009, the threat of command change in Iran was not entirely off the table in Washington, and the United States invested hundreds of millions of dollars (Muzaffar, et al. 2018; Rogers, 2014).

The Iranian Uprising and the fall of the Shah at the end of the 1970s were shocking for the US external policy formation. The Shah's government had been a critical fortification in the Western security carriage against the Soviet Union in the Middle East at the tallness of the Cold War. Sudden damage flung into misperception of US security strategy through the region (Aldasam, 2013). Further to this was the holding captive of 52 US envoys and people for 444 days from November 1979 to January 1981, an occasion that permanently affected the US Government Department's boldness towards Iran. Consequent US funding for Iraq towards the finish of the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988 finished stocks worse, as did the attitude of the George W Bush management when it arose to control in 2000. There was a belief in neo-traditional and confident radical rounds within the Bush management that Iran was the utmost danger to US benefits in the region, even before 9/11. There was an extensive view that the command had to be split somehow (Katzman, 2017). As a direct result of the 9/11 slaughters, the United States positively finished the Taliban administration in Afghanistan and discrete the al-Qaida drive. By January 2002, President Bush brought his first State of the Union Speech to Congress, reporting on a positive answer to a severe attack (Kerr, 2009). Maybe the maximum important feature of an immensely prevalent speech was the statement of the start of a much more comprehensive development of the war on terror. This was the choice to encompass the war to counter an axis of evil. The Iranian reply to Bush's talking was aggressive, given that the administration in Tehran had not delayed the US termination of the Taliban government across the edge just three months earlier. The president, Mohammad Khatami, had been relatively open to refining relations with the West, but in this new-fangled political atmosphere that was now bounded (Perthes, 2010).

Iran continues to be referred to as "crippling" sanctions and also to seek regime change in Tehran. In the 2000s, Iran was branded as an "axis of the evil state," In Washington, it was often repeated that "all means are on the table" towards Iran. To be sure, Iran also did its part to further the enmity over the years. The present and the possible futures of Iran-US relations cannot be understood apart from the past (Cortright, 2006). In the meantime, explicit enmity between Iran and the US rose to a superficial succeeding Islamic Revolution in Iran. The accusations of numerous Iranians had been ingrained in the extreme authoritarianism by the US-supported tyranny of the Shah of Iran (Borszik, 2014). The Iranian rule has constantly responded to apparent US anger and concealed attempts to destabilize their authority with progressively antagonistic posing. This hostile posturing has to be understood by the US as an indication of animosity by Iranians. On the other hand, the Obama government has been making thoughtful efforts to reduce strain levels between the two states by stimulating negotiations between the US and Iran (Jentelson, 2007). The Western entrance of novelty presented the idea of nation-states and controlled politics in the global system. Iran's involvement under British, Russian, and American power stimulated Iranian leaders to think and perform in agreement with practicality in some regions of their foreign policy (Jentelson, 2007).

The Iran-Iraq war had also stuck Iran's pragmatist foreign policy as it damaged the very being of the Islamic Republic from its start. Thus, Iran's foreign policy fixed the realist mission for being and security. The nuclear rule for sample proves scraps of realism as Iranian leaders defend their nuclear program to be a matter of independence in an ever

more dangerous world trusting significantly on energy (Kerr, 2009). However, the Iranian inspiration for emerging a nuclear competent needs to be virtuously planned. It has been seen as recompense for Iran's disgrace at the hands of the West during the last centuries and as a Relationship Card to select and appreciate the club of nuclear powers to which Iran touches. India and Pakistan as professed nuclear powers and Israel as an undeclared power worsens the Iranian intelligence thought in the international request for Iran to sacrifice its nuclear program (Khan, 2015). Overseas efforts to deter Iran from realizing this goal are seen as an insult to national pride and have stimulated loyal provisions for the government's disobedience policy. While Iran officially repudiates having any form of abilities or agendas which is obtainable as an aware yielding of Iran's national right to such missiles for the sake of regional self-assurance building and constancy. Iran signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, allowing for comparatively invasive inspection (Viaud, 2016). The present Iranian command's acceptance of the NPT derives from its being hereditary from Shah's command. The prejudiced nature of the agreement and the detail that Israel, India, and Pakistan are not parties would have been sufficient for Iran not to symbolize the agreement where it is carried up today. However, the rank that Iran accords to international legality shaped restraints that need (Rogers, 2014).

Literature Review

The strategy of Iran toward atomic matter will continue to be hostile. In this argument, no basket of temptations will encourage Iran to give up what it has professed to be its absolute right to control the whole fuel cycle (Grogan, 2000). As the conflict with Iran goes into a phase of UNSC permissions and financial boycotts, the choice-making process will become more and more narrowed to a limited circle, with Ahmadinejad and the disciplinarians of the IRGC having the better hand. If the West or the U.S. individually executes authorizations, the government may probably reply with counter-steps as defined above (Katzman, 2017). Since the revelation of Iran's nuclear program in 2002, Tehran has maintained its permissible right to a pacific nuclear program under the Non-Proliferation Treaty it signed in 1968. Iran's search for nuclear technology has revealed the multi-layered nature of international law and the choices at the states' removal in attaining their national attention. This proves the usefulness of the Institute of international law and, its result, international responsibilities in studying and thoughtful Iranian foreign policy (Dumbrell, 2007). The publication of the U.S. National Intellect Estimate is professed in Tehran as justification of the Iranian policy vis-à-vis the atomic matter. The media explanation of the NIE licenses a profound investigation of the fundamental facts from the Iranian side. The NIE stresses that the close to the scheme took residence when Iran was under a substantial radical burden to stop its atomic program. The radical burden on Iran was much less at that time than nowadays (Aldasam, 2013). It was outstanding to the armed burden established by the detail that the United States had just collapsed an adjacent government. Indeed Iran was replaced with great carefulness during those first months of 2003, dreading that any reason it may give the U.S. would outcome in an Iranian Autonomy operation (Kerr, 2009).

The atomic issue for Iran has been, until now, the atomic program itself and the discussions with the global community (IAEA, E3). Therefore, some complicated persons have come from the political field and have increased fame. This, however, does not unavoidably designate that they will continue within the choice-creation process as Iran comes earlier to an armed nuclear possibility (Macaluso, 2015). As Iran spreads its goal, it may be predictable that the IRGC and Ahmadinejad's close consultants will try to order Iran's nuclear plan. It is, therefore, essential that no older separation between these groups has a relation in Western calculated beliefs and the compound area of regulator of atomic arms. The upcoming Iranian policy for knowledge and control of atomic arms and even

the use of such arms may contain basics that originate from the sole construction of the rule (Baldwin, 1993). Hence the valuation that has come up in Iranian declarations that Iran may clasp a primary strike capability contrary to Israel may, in the upcoming, tip the balances in favor of a strategy of use of atomic weapons if the government trusts that by such use, it will make a pro-Iranian radical trend in the Arab and Muslim biosphere the threat of atomic revenge against Iran on a scale that would yet leave the country and the command complete may not serve for natural prevention (Rogers, 2014). Due to the radical change in the regional construction of the Middle East after 9/11, the United States has been able to find its attendance on Iran's doorstep. With the American armed interference in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Iranian distant policy became ruled by the commands of realpolitik (Hussein, 2008). After 2003 spiritual certification became a tool of operation to build safety associations with the Shia groups across the region. The contentious Shi'a Crescent in television refers to this philosophical, religious block against Sunni Islam. On the other hand, Kemp and Nasr have traveled the inferences of the war on Iraq and decided the reduction of Saddam has led to an essential change in the regional scenery in the Middle East. Kemp maintains that Iran's need for an atomic bomb results from complex logical and geopolitical conditions (Macaluso, 2015). In *The Shia Revival*, Nasr contends that the Shia groups have been able to start fresh social, financial, and radical ties across the Middle East, the most convincing being the association of Iran and Iraq. This is reinforced by Slaving claiming Iran's planning for Iraq includes creating a zone of effect and a bumper against U.S. attack. Moreover, the policy of Tehran of turning Iraq into a friend eases the creation of a radical block that can deteriorate the outdated safety system of the region, basically placed in the interest of external controls and not Iran. Apart from controlling government, the Shia groups have access to around 30 percent of the world's oil assets (Rogers, 2014).

Iranian foreign policy has been unfeasible and naïve originating from deteriorating to intensify extent of the total change in the post-Soviet setting. The grouping of an impractical foreign policy and Tehran's incapability to yield its conceptual luggage has damaged their safety by promising key companies to undermine it. However, as stated previously, he writes the Islamic Republic to be a regular and pragmatist actor, which has much to do with Tehran's control over its standing as it plays a more confident role expected of a regional middle power in the Middle East. Besides geopolitical issues, interior actors are demanded to play a role in Iranian foreign policy (Cortright, 2006). Ahmadinejad's annual communication to the UNGA, but in its place of providing a rationalist answer such as his precursor Khatami he selected a revolutionist vision and planned characteristically used by the Supreme Leader Khamenei. Khamenei Ahmadinejad says that all the world glitches can only be determined through complete faith and contract with God and His motivation (Aldasam, 2013). His displeasure of the West surrounded by the realist ritual is very much like the careful repetition of the declarations of Iran's supreme leader. Actions of the West and the United States can only be taken in realist terms to legitimize and defend Iran's nature in global society as a revolutionist state directed by Islam, a change most evident in the reports of Khamenei (Grogan, 2000). In every talking, realism is a decorously experienced creativity skillful by the United States and its Western partners, shining the core advice commonly originating in the supreme leader's remarks. Ahmadinejad trembles the same message at the United Nations for the international radical leaders to hear it mitigating Iran's foreign policy. The power of hegemonic powers, the United States is harassed to be wicked, bringing about dire costs for the rest of the world and strengthening an unjust world order (Borszik, 2014).

Material and Methods

With an emphasis on documenting the social phenomena connected to U.S.-Iran relations, this research applies a descriptive qualitative technique. In order to understand the context of time and place associated to the United States and Iran, it offers an interpretation and analysis of ties between the United States and Iran during Mahmud Ahmadinejad's administration. By evaluating certain factors and examining the link between each element, this research further aims to clarify and analyse the Iranian nuclear problem and its social reality. The goal of this theoretical framework is to improve comprehension rather than to testify to certain theories of international relations. It also helps to put the empirical (analytical) parts into perspective and make it more understandable. It attempts to look into the two-way interaction between Iran and the US under Mahmud Ahmadinejad, focusing on their pursuit of national security and regional objectives in diverse contexts. When applied to the case study of Iran, the neorealist philosophy reveals both the American and Iranian governments' motivations. Iran is geographically isolated, but having interesting crude oil and gas qualities. As a result, it is unable to fulfil its goals and develop to the fullest extent feasible. It aims to strengthen economic and industrial independence as a consequence by conducting its own atomic research and uranium upgrading. From a practical standpoint, Iran tends to use its influence to balance out other countries that govern the biosphere's status quo, such the United States. Additionally, it works to defend the safety and dominion requirements to which it is legally entitled. Iran is portrayed by the United States as a dangerous hegemon that intends to develop nuclear weapons. The information was gathered by reviewing the literature on the subject of the study in journals, theses, news stories, research papers, and other relevant scientific publications.

Results and Discussion

Mahmud Ahmadinejad Iranian foreign policy has highlighted the position of importance as a previous comprehensive framework for any continued US-Iranian discussion agenda that would be obviously concerned with essentially realigning the US-Iran relations addressing the Islamic Republic's safety interests identifying its regional role and regulating its global status. Without such a framework, Iranian leaders cannot have poise in the end goal of appointment with the United States. From an Iranian viewpoint, an incremental process of agreement with the United States is not practical (Kerr, 2009). Ahmadinejad's national agenda and the rearrangement of power were ably simplified by highly accidental conditions, both with admiration for the budget and the international situation. In 2005 Ahmadinejad congenital a nuclear crisis which, after two years of twisting discussions, had not reached an acceptable decision. The details of this course can be found elsewhere. But serve it to say that both Iran and the gatherings with which it transferred share the responsibility for the letdown of progress by 2005 with no little satire that it was only at this late date that the Europeans had persuaded the United States to take a much more noticeable role in the talks at the very time (Cortright, 2006).

When the investiture of Ahmadinejad signified a shift away from discussions for the Iranians fortified not only by the failures of the Khatami administration but also by the understanding that the U.S. position in the Middle East was no longer as healthy or poised as it had been in 2003. Ahmadinejad argued that Iran could only attain the outcomes it wanted by being vigorous and argumentative and that the preparedness to cooperate was taken as a sign of faintness of the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush and, maybe most prominently, 2005 America's room for the movement was significantly more limited. There were many within the Iranian political choice who accepted this general valuation quarreling that Khatami's goodwill had largely been rejected and that the United

States only appreciated force. Ahmadinejad's approach was armor-plated by a worldview that took this investigation into a phase added (Aldasam, 2013). The Ahmadinejad management obtainable a threefold account of the nuclear matter, which considerably replicated the distrust of the Principle lists and the military-security section concerning Western core authorities' purposes and performances via Iran and within international organizations. Iran removed extra self-confident nuclear rule, which was continual during the period from 2005 to 2013. The pathway of confrontation and commitment proved moderately helpful both nationally and superficially (Grogan, 2000). The Ahmadinejad government's threefold description of the governmentally interested emergency is valuable, underlining that my applicants methodically painted a wave of thoughtful anger with the EU-3. In their view, the nuclear matter must have been determined during the Khatami presidency. The fact that it was not as descriptive of their enemies' purpose to weigh Iran as much as likely to divest it of its nuclear privileges (Jentelson, 2007).

From the start of his presidency, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was penetrating on tightfitting the weakness of the worldwide scheme, although it was a much slower process with a much brighter tenor at his first dialog at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to severer ones as the years advanced. His precursor had already stated the flaws afflicting the system and ways of possibly refining it in a much more political manner, while Ahmadinejad exploited naming and uncomfortable countries, predominantly in the West, sparkly the Hajj words of the supreme leader (Robb, 2008). This was mostly due to the UNSC's hostility to the Nuclear Program of Iran, which came under fire as soon as Ahmadinejad took office and restarted uranium enhancement. From Iran's standpoint, the West was once again superseding the country's affairs as it did historically to obstruct its technological progress (Rogers, 2014). For him, it meant that Iran is being underprivileged by an alternative source of the vigor that will become more important as remnant fuel assets are getting expended to collapse. This is pure interference and challenges the rationalist norm in his view. I confer nuclear politics in a distinct section, but for now, let's return to how Ahmadinejad edges the unjust world order in his dissertation (Zrost, 2011). Iran was additionally accommodating, and the speakers thought Iran would be talented at solving all through the channels of discussions. Iranians were looking for their Western partners to answer the lot to size self-confidence and confirm Iran's unchallengeable correct to nuclear vigor. We organized all we could, but this method did not transport any outcomes to Iran. This was unpleasant knowledge for Iran. Iran was not effective at all with this method. With each step, Iran was attracting Western countries required further and further (Grogan, 2000).

Although Iran is fully applying the NPT, what might be the status quo if Iran were not a party to the NPT. It would certainly not have confronted such tests in the IAEA and U.N. Security Council, but it would have been included for nuclear collaboration by similar nations which have shaped problems and imposed prohibited resolves and approvals (Holmquist, 2016). The unpleasantness and disgrace of this knowledge should not be undervalued. It considerably shaped the Ahmadinejad government's insight into nuclear matter and its range of allowable choices, thus presenting that history vibrates and acts as a range of clarifications and movements. The Ahmadinejad government signed the collective militarization of Iran's national government, a growth believed to be significant by the controlling Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei (Kerr, 2009). Iran's track to liberalization and democratization had thus agreed method to a greatly politically patriotic, anti-elitist, and demanding government. More troublingly, from the viewpoint of many doctors and forecasters, the Principle lists were highly doubtful of and aggressive to the Western core controls and their local partners (Grogan, 2000). The world, in the view of this collection, is a Hobbesian one of constant fight where greedy powers prowl to command and control and where the only money is armed power. Power, in this opinion,

is the essential element for existence and for the delay of the government values beyond its boundaries. What is known by Ahmadinejad as active mediation labels a policy that seeks to raise power not just to live but to enforce Iran on the international community (Katzman, 2017). In his September 2012 address to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), U.S. President Obama stated that a nuclear-armed Iran is not a trial that can be controlled. Fitzpatrick, for his part, cautioned against the greenness and inflexible views of President Ahmadinejad and his associates, which might lead to shocking mistakes. He also criticized Ahmadinejad's shameless calls for Israel to be spread off the map, which underscored the existential danger a nuclear weapon in Iran's hands would attitude to that country. The Israeli leadership frequently made this point describing a nuclear weapon-capable let without help a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential danger (Zrost, 2011).

The nuclear dispute between the United States and Iran

Iran's nuclear determinations are knocking the creation at danger, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton consumes cautioned. She said representatives at a nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) consultation that Iran had dishonored its responsibilities and must be detained for the explanation. Previously, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran suspected conditions with nuclear weaponries of aggressive persons who required to progress diplomatic nuclear-powered knowledge (Kerr, 2009). His explanations encouraged representatives from the US, the UK, and France to pace obtainable. The US Department of Defense advanced revealed that it had an overall impact on nuclear weapons in its collection, a closely-guarded underground for periods. Mrs. Clinton said the change was to recover photographs from the nuclear decommissioning government and inspire other countries to conform to it. Thus, persons who are uncertain that the United States' determination does its portion on decommissioning this is our greatest these are our promises, and they refer to a clear, obvious sign, she said the NPT meeting (Hays, 2008). Mrs. Clinton repeatedly rounded on Iran's reproachful President Ahmadinejad for contribution to the similar exhausted incorrect and sometimes remote claims in contradiction of the US and others. Iran will prepare so it can distract care gone from its private record in an effort to avoid responsibility. She said Iran is the single state denoted in this hall that has been created by the International Atomic Energy Agency panel of councils to be now in non-compliance with its nuclear protection duties (Macaluso, 2015). It has disobeyed the UN Security Council and the IAEA and located the upcoming non-proliferation regime in danger, and that is why it is fronting collective separation and burden from the international public (Rasamny, 2016).

The US is presently exchanging with other Security Council followers to enforce a fourth round of UN financial authorizations compared to Iran over its uranium enhancement plan. Tehran maintains its nuclear program is totally peaceable (Baldwin, 1993). The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty contains a grand inexpensive BBC Political writer Jonathan Marcus says Mahmoud Ahmadinejad disapproved of nuclear authorities for weakening to deactivate. The five major nuclear powers, the US, the previous Soviet Union, China, the UK, and France, decided to finally defuse. Other participants approved not ever progressing with nuclear weapons in return for getting full access to citizen nuclear-powered knowledge (Perthes, 2010). But then again, our communicator says, the reduction is looking gradually ragged, with opponents disagreeing that the original nuclear weapons conditions have not occupied their decommissioning tasks extremely. In his speech, Mr. Ahmadinejad disapproved of nuclear-powered for weakening to defuse, saying their manufacture, storing, and qualitative development of nuclear weapons now helps as an explanation for others to grow their personal. The nuclear bomb is a passion against humankind rather than a weapon of defense. The ownership of nuclear bombs is

not a foundation of self-importance. Its ownership is revolting and disgraceful (Zrost, 2011).

Iran's Approach to the Nuclear Weapons

The strategy of Iran toward atomic matter will continue to be hostile. At this argument, it seems that no basket of temptations will encourage Iran to give up what it has professed to be its absolute right to control the whole fuel cycle. As the conflict with Iran goes into a phase of UNSC permissions and financial boycotts, the choice-making process will become more and more narrowed to a limited circle, with Ahmadinejad and the disciplinarians of the IRGC having the better hand. If the West or the US individually executes authorizations, the government may be probable to reply with counter-steps (Holmquist, 2016). The publication of the US National Intellect Estimate is professed in Tehran as justification of the Iranian policy vis-à-vis the atomic matter. The media explanation of the NIE licenses a profound investigation of the fundamental facts from the Iranian side. The NIE stresses that the close to the scheme took residence at a time when Iran was under an important radical burden to stop its atomic program (Robb, 2008). In fact, the radical burden on Iran was much less at that time than nowadays. It was outstanding to the armed burden established by the detail that the United States had just collapsed an adjacent government. Like Iran was recognized by the US as part of an axis of evil and engaged its capital, a second rascal government, Libya had surrendered to Western compression and rejected its atomic program. Indeed Iran was replaced with great carefulness during those first months of 2003, dreading that any reason it may give the US would outcome in an Iranian Autonomy operation (Viaud, 2016).

The expensive and mistaken nuclear and socioeconomic strategies of the Ahmadinejad direction accounted partially for Iran's financial decline, which was also partly by the complete US and EU authorizations and produced popular prevention. This dissatisfaction was attended by a gathering about the flag effect in the country (Holmquist, 2016). Radical elite, which was engrossed neither totally against the outside Western authorization actors nor against the government as a whole. Rather, this sentimentality was interpreted into radical pressure, which was straight and exclusively directed toward Ahmadinejad and his sub-faction. Due to the combined nature of the government, the president might be made the accused for the existing authorizations, whereas Khamenei continued comparatively resolutely in the burden (Aldasam, 2013). Thus the sanctions did not put the government in its total under a burden. The highest leader's method of using the deepened US and EU authorizations, which he obtainable as a bout on his republic and its command in order to uphold intra-elite consistency, was fruitful to some degree as it provided a reason for the government and its groups to regroup (Borszik, 2014).

The atomic issue for Iran has been, until now, the atomic program itself and the discussions with the global community (IAEA, E3). Therefore, some of the people who are complicated have come from the political field and have increased fame. This, however does not unavoidably designate that they will continue within the choice-creation process as Iran comes earlier to the possibility of an armed nuclear deal (Dumbrell, 2007). As Iran spreads its goal, it may be predictable that the IRGC and Ahmadinejad's close consultants will make an effort to order Iran's nuclear plan. It is therefore important that no older separation between these groups has related to Western calculated beliefs and the compound area of regulator of atomic arms (Grogan, 2000). The upcoming Iranian policy for knowledge and control of atomic arms and even the use of such arms would perhaps contain basics that originate from the sole construction of the rule. Hence the valuation that has come up in Iranian declarations that Iran may clasp a primary strike capability contrary to Israel may, in the upcoming, tip the balances in favor of a strategy of use of

atomic weapons if the government trusts that by such use, it will make a pro-Iranian radical trend in the Arab and Muslim biosphere the threat of atomic revenge against Iran on a scale that would yet leave the country and the command complete may not serve for real prevention (Cortright, 2006).

The official narrative about the nuclear issue

President Ahmadinejad and his supporters offered an extremely securitized and conspiratorial clarification of the deep reasons for Iran's nuclear enemies. Before going on to the Ahmadinejad government's threefold account of the governmentally moved disaster, it is valued stress that my candidates methodically decorated a deep annoyance with the EU-3. In their view, the nuclear matter must have been resolved during the Khatami presidency (Hays, 2008). The fact that it was not as demonstrative of its enemies meant to pressure Iran as much as probable to divest it of its nuclear human rights. Iran was more accommodating, and the representatives thought Iran would be clever to solve all the channels of discussion. Iranians were observing their Western associates solve the whole thing to build self-confidence and confirm Iran's unchallengeable accuracy to nuclear energy. We did everything we might, but this method did not convey any results to Iran. It had been an unpleasant experience for Iran (Jentelson, 2007). In exchange for their promise to forego the ownership of nuclear weapons, NNWSs were provided two agreements. First, they had the right to use nuclear technologies for peaceable purposes. Second, the NWSs would deactivate Each of the Gatherings to the Treaty undertakes to follow discussions in good trust on real events relating to the close of the nuclear weapons race at an early date and to nuclear decommissioning and on a treaty on overall and complete nuclear disarmament under strict and actual international regulator (Holmquist, 2016). The NWSs were thus obliged to move near nuclear decommissioning in good trust. This was a legal sympathy but also a political hope (Kerr, 2009).

Despite clear supplies of Article VI of the Agreement and the Act of the IAEA, no single account has been delivered by the IAEA checkers on the nuclear weapons services of the United States and its associates, nor is there any plan for their decommissioning (Baldwin, 1993). The IAEA has been stroking the most likely weights on non-nuclear weapon States under the excuse of propagation risks; at the same time, as those having nuclear bombs remain to enjoy full protection and high-class rights opposing to their legal responsibilities, several NWSs wanted qualitative and quantitative development of their nuclear-powered collections (Macaluso, 2015). The International Thermonuclear Energy Agency, the UN nuclear-powered regulator, established it would refer a team to Iran between 29 and 31 January to resolve all remaining practical matters. In an account previous November, the IAEA said it had info telling Iran had approved out examinations related to the growth of a nuclear short-tempered expedient. Iran trades most of its lubricant to states in Asia. The EU and the United States are nowadays working to encourage Asian countries to decrease their consumption from Iran as healthy (Perthes, 2010). But then, Beijing disapproved of the European Union for its prohibition. China, a big trader of unpolished Iranian oil, has extended opposite independent permissions directing Iran's energy area. It says the nuclear disagreement should be determined through the interchange. China's certified Xinhua News Agency recited its foreign ministry as saying: To sightless compression and enforce approvals on Iran are not helpful tactics. Iran has previously exposed to react to the sanctions compared to it by spoiling the Channel of Hormuz upon its arrival to the Gulf finished, which 20% of the world's oil transfers pass. The US has said it will retain the trade way open, raising the option of a conflict (Borszik, 2014).

The NPT respites upon three key supports peaceable use of nuclear energy (Articles IV and V), non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Articles I, II, and III), and nuclear disarmament of nuclear weapons stores (Article VI). In exchange for their promise to forego the ownership of nuclear weapons, NNWSs were provided two agreements. (Joyner) First, they had the right to use nuclear technologies for peaceable purposes (Katzman, 2017). Beginning the viewpoint of the Ahmadinejad government, the prejudiced clarification and unequal implementation of the NPT's provisions established thoughtful intimidations to the sustainability of the non-proliferation command (Borszik, 2014). By weakening to decrease and remove their nuclear collections, the NWSs ran the danger that the NNWSs would lose faith and self-confidence in the profits of the Treaty, thus discouraging the projections of international peace and safety. It is now clear that the manufacture and stock up of nuclear weapons and guidelines trained by some nuclear weapon Conditions, along with the faintness of and the inequity in the NPT requirements, have been the main reasons for diffidence and helped as a motivation for the progress of such weaponries (Rasamny, 2016).

Obama receives a hostile response from Iran

President Obama's management has more than one motivation to finally bring the Iranian disagreement to an adjacent and re-establish a perpetual negotiation with Tehran. It has been claimed that the US association with Iran's strength convert as one of the rare accomplishments of Obama's top in external policy since the commencement of his mandate. In this situation, a waged relation or an upgrading in discussion with Tehran would make it calmer to contract with the numerous areas of resistance that remain in the region. In order to increase the chances of a definitive agreement, the management has to go back to some of the basics that energy his first appointment or effort for global societies (Katzman, 2017). A top Iranian certified has said Barack Obama is the preferred applicant of Tehran, calling him additional balanced than John McCain in comments that could be a rummage sale in contradiction of the Self-governing US presidential confidence. Ali Larijani talked of the Iranian assembly and told journalists his administration was leaning more in favor of Barack Obama since he is supplier and more balanced even though we know American strategy to Iran will not require alteration that plentiful (Kerr, 2009). Larijani as a partner of Ayatollah Ali Khomeini, the supreme Iranian leader, helped until the previous year as his republic chief delegate in talks to pull to pieces Tehran's nuclear program. With the Iranian determination impending next year, he is careful a potential opponent of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Holmquist, 2016).

Larijani explanations could deliver ammunition for the McCain movement for occurrence. The idea that Tehran favors the Democrats could strengthen McCain's case for threatening to talk contrary to the regime. Before Obama demanded his party proposals, The Republicans were already singing up an optimistic appraisal from a senior radical adviser to Hamas. Potential quoting the Palestinian confrontational group rave review (Kerr, 2009). Obama acknowledged his own convincing attack physical this week's politeness of al-Hesbah. A website is helpful for al-Qaida, which is termed impulsive. McCain was its favored presidential candidate. AL-Qaida will have to sustenance McCain in the imminent voting, an explanation forwarded this week on al-Hashab said, adding that the Pro-republic would follow the deteriorating march of his ancestor George W Bush (Aldasam, 2013). As well as observing Iran's view of the US votes, Larijani discharged the probability of a US occurrence on Iran. The risk was low before he told the presses in Bahrain. But now I am 100% certain that the United States will not uncheck a war in contradiction of Iran. The financial disaster has cost the United States \$1.4tn, and Washington is employed to resolve its internal problems and not war (Borszik, 2014).

Conclusion

It is essential to conclude that the past is necessary to understand the current and potential future of US-Iran relations. The Iranian government has been becoming more aggressive in response to the US administration's apparent fury and covert measures to undermine their control. The US should see this unfriendly behavior as a sign of Iranian hostility. Conversely, the Obama administration has been actively encouraging talks between the US and Iran to lessen tensions between the two countries. The geopolitical circumstances in Iran have hindered the construction of a calibrated road plan for enhancing the connection being considered for parallel and reciprocal measures in the direction of their involvement. The US options for cooperation with Iran are most promising in the area of the economy. Trade and financial investments will promote social change individually and may also encourage Iranians to adopt attitudes that could serve as a foundation for bettering political and diplomatic ties between the two countries. Additional avenues for engagement between Iran and the US may also need to be pursued right away, including Track-II diplomacy and negotiations as well as interactions with civil society and (NGOs) non-governmental organizations, which are already underway, may be expanded, and may serve as a link for the exchange of diplomatic and parliamentary ties. With the several options being decided as a totality, Iran's reciprocity may be anticipated. The anti-US elements could prevail against the Iranian authorities trying to participate in these drills. With the US government's decision to break the current impasse, a new methodology may be required. This methodology must proceed by taking into account all of the US intentions as well as the overall geopolitical situation in order to formulate preferences that are realistic for foreseeable situation in relation to formulating preferences that are practicable and anticipated.

Specifically, Iran aims to promise Israeli and American interests inside its borders, to thwart the territorial influence of Saudi Arabia, and to fight U.S. security plans with the help of its territorial allies in order to discuss its overarching tactical fears. For instance, Iran has attempted to sway its Regional neighbors away from the U.S. by using "economic diplomacy" inside its territory. Iran's ties to Syria and those it has maintained with proxies such as Hezbollah, Shi'ite Iraqi political parties, and Hamas provide it a tactical advantage over its rivals and neighbors (Muzaffar, et. al. 2017) According to Kayhan Barzegar, Iran's "coalition policy" consists of "constructing ties with friendly counties (such as Syria) and political activities (such as Hezbollah and Shiite Factions in Iraq) in order to prevent the US-Israeli armed danger in the short term and to stop the influence of a U.S. role in the region in the long term." Finally, to boost the importance of the position obtained in its territorial economic role and to rescue itself from international pressure, Iran has concentrated on molding the aspects of its economy most related to its neighbors. Iran takes several measures toward this end. First, there is the expansion of its military and the development of its atomic program; second, the conduct of political collaboration; third, the execution of covert operations; fourth, the dissemination of religious, cultural, and informational materials; and fifth, the promotion of commercial and trade activities.

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