



## Introduction

### RESEARCH PAPER

## Sino-Indian War 1962: Impacts on Foreign Policy of Pakistan towards Kashmir

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### ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes Pakistan's foreign policy evolution concerning Kashmir following the 1962 Sino-Indian war, investigating influencing factors. The Sino-Indian war's aftermath profoundly impacted Pakistan's foreign policy, particularly regarding the Kashmir dispute with India. The "enemy of my enemy is my friend" principle bolstered Sino-Pak ties, affecting Kashmir. The study examines Pakistan's foreign policy through various lenses, including its US defense alliance, President Ayub Khan's policies, military strategies, operations, and bilateral relations with China and the Soviet Union. It scrutinizes Pakistan's 1962-1969 relationship with the US, focusing on the 1965 India-Pakistan war and its Kashmir implications. Results indicate that the Sino-Indian war significantly shaped Pakistan's foreign policy, fortifying its Kashmir stance against India and influencing alliances and strategies. The study underscores the importance of historical context and international alliances in comprehending foreign policy shifts and advocates further research into the lasting impacts of such events on regional geopolitics.

### KEYWORDS

Foreign Policy of Pakistan, Kashmir, Sino-Indian War 1962

### Introduction

The foreign policy of Pakistan has been significantly shaped by the security concerns stemming from its neighboring country, India. Border clashes occurred between the two nations in 1948, 1965, and 1971 (Muzaffar, et. al. 2016) To effectively address the persisting Indian threat, Pakistan's foreign relations are primarily geared towards obtaining military technology and defense aid. Pakistan's insecurity since its establishment, partly due to unresolved issues like Kashmir, prompted it to cultivate stronger ties with the US and China (Dwivedi, 2022). These fears further escalated in 1960s when India purchased a large number of planes and war equipment from its allies particularly from Soviet Union (Dwivedi, 2022).

According to Iqbal Akhund (a Pakistani diplomat), the creation of Pakistan was not a pleasure for Nehru and the Congress leaders, due to the reason the security of the state was a big challenge for Pakistan. Field Marshal Ayub Khan (President of Pakistan) has written in his memoirs, *Friends Not Masters* that the main concerns of the foreign policy of Pakistan have been security as well as developments (Dwivedi, 2022). In order to realize the immensity of Ayub's reshuffling of already existed overseas dogma one necessarily have to keep in mind the position of Pakistan as a geographical unit alienated by 1000 miles of hostile region. One of the most important considerations of Pakistan was the safety of its long and exposed frontiers.

When Ayub Khan came into power on October 7, 1958; the foreign policy of Pakistan was inclined towards the United States of America (USA/US). Pakistan had

entered into defense alliance with US through two defense pacts in 1954 and in 1955 known as SEATO and CENTO respectively (Southeast Asian Treaty Organization). It was the time when China had separated its paths from Pakistan and warned Pakistan to stay away from the cliff. Furthermore, there were certain border issues between China and Pakistan which were creating troubles between both of them. However, Pakistan's security concerns remained the main reason for pushing it towards West or North (towards China). Due to the security threats from India, Pakistan tilted towards US for economic and strategic assistance to counterbalance its military power as well as its fluctuating economy. But after 1960s presidential elections in US, when Mr. John F. Kennedy became President, Pakistan felt isolated in the region because John's strategies were deeply tilted towards India despite of its defence alliances with Pakistan (through two defense pacts SEATO & CENTO). In Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, Pakistan took lessons from the past events (When US was providing military assistance to India on a large scale) and President Ayub Khan modified the external policies of his country and from 1962 onward, Pakistan's foreign policy was bilateral and considerably inclined towards China due to Chinese assistance and support in the Indo-Pak war of 1965 when US adopted the policy of neutrality. Pakistan adopted the policy of bilateralism from 1962 to 1969 and earned prospective relations with China and signed 30 development projects with USSR through five year plan i.e. 1962-70 (Rajput, 2022).

Among other reasons of Indo-China accord, the geographical location of the Indian Ocean was the most significant one due to its noteworthy and busiest bodies of water with enormous economic share (Afzal, et. al. 2020). The two rising nations India and China are at forefront in this new wave of geopolitical discord in Indian Ocean region (Fisher, 1963). Deep-seated distrust fuels India-Pakistan conflict, stifling cooperation and fostering rivalry. Historical perspectives underpin this suspicion. Expanding spheres of influence perpetuate the rivalry, an endless race for dominance. Territorial borders, shaped by history and colonialism, also shape relations. Notably, disputes like Kashmir and Southern Tibet reveal historical complexities. The British Indian government's strategic manipulation of borders for defense added to future conflicts among regional neighbors. As the British left, the absence of effective border management mechanisms exacerbated tensions.

Ayub Khan aimed for a peaceful Kashmir settlement, despite unfulfilled US pressure on India. US armed India against China in 1962, intensifying India's aggression against Pakistan, leading to the 1965 war. The Sino-Indian conflict triggered a pivotal shift in Pakistan's foreign policy. Pre-1965, the Rann of Kutch conflict prompted operations in Kashmir ("Operation Grand Slam" and "Operation Gibraltar"), escalating into the 1965 war. China backed Pakistan, USSR mediated via the Tashkent Agreement (1966), showcasing Moscow's diplomatic influence. Post-Tashkent, Pakistan shifted from bilateralism to non-alignment (1969-1981), bolstering ties with Arabian nations, forming the United Ministerial Commission (UMC) for cooperation. Withdrawal from SEATO followed due to the absence of anticipated US support in the 1971 war, leading Pakistan to initiate its nuclear program to deter India's threats and assert regional nuclear capability.

### **Legacy: Sino-Indian Conflict 1962**

In October 1962, India and China clashed over the Himalayan border, a conflict triggered by tensions and border clashes post-Tibetan revolt in 1959. India's Forward Policy and China's assertiveness escalated matters, culminating in a war from October 20 to November 21, 1962. China's victory achieved border goals, while India's non-alignment strategy suffered a setback. The conflict exposed communication gaps between Indian

politicians and the military. This event proved pivotal for both countries. India confronted military deficiencies and undertook introspection. Pakistan capitalized on India's weakness, reevaluating its foreign policy. While the reasons behind China's escalation remain debated, the war marked a turning point for India and the region, reshaping diplomatic and security dynamics.

Because of China's prudence after the first decisive engagements, it was not intended to cripple India at the time. The Indian case for the disputed territory rested heavily on the immediate imperial past (Wright, 1989). The disagreement had the appearance of traditional border dispute, and China made its claim for the territory only when it was practically able to do so. Sino-Soviet relations were worse at that time and the friendly ties of Indo-Soviet were an obvious threat to China's security and international standing. It was an extraordinary limited war, as most of the Indian troops were never committed to the battle (Masood, et. al. 2020) One of the utmost attracted witnesses to Indian disgrace as well as state having the most to improve from the outcome was Pakistan. Chinese policy towards Pakistan was combined with subtle pressure and with overt goodwill. China was able to grant favors to Pakistan without compromising its dignity.

The arena of interest for China in this respect was that of the non-aligned states, for its military success against India immediately raised the question of India's previously undisputed leadership of this bloc. If the effect of the clash between India and China in 1962 was to push Indian republic in a *de facto* association with the West, then its situation of management of the non-aligned set has been open to challenge. After a short period of disorientation after the war, India modified its non-alignment policy and didn't become the political tool of western governments, which would have destroyed its position in the non-alignment movement (Jha, 1970). One of the most immediate results of the conflict was that the western nations were dramatically alerted to India's weakness in the face of what they perceived to be a security threat which has implications for global as well as regional politics.

The Chinese Communist Party strategists were most likely aware that the Soviet leaders would not be too concerned about the American supply of arms to India after 1962, because there were limits to what US could offer to India without placing its relationship with Pakistan in jeopardy. In the cold war atmosphere of the early 1960s, Chinese were suspecting that India and the US acting in concert had the potential to attack China sometime in future. Chinese also felt on the defensive against what they regarded as the designs of the imperialists' powers particularly the United States, towards themselves, and that the American government would as a matter of course attempt to capitalize on the Sino-Indian conflict (Wright, 1989).

According to the Bruce Riedel view, a previous CIA officer, who authored a booklet in which he states that Nehru was repeatedly sending letters to Kennedy for joining the fight in contradiction of China who joined in a fight to overthrow the forces of China. But on the other hand, President John F. Kennedy was trying to forestall a Pakistani attack on India (Suresh Nambath, 2015). Kennedy played a decisive role in this regard (Riedel, 2015).

### **Foreign Policy, Transition Phase: 1962-69 (Bilateralism)**

As soon as the Sino-Indian war came to an end, China was leaning towards Pakistan and armed bonds between China and Pakistan have advanced since India was beleaguered as the mutual opponent. Throughout the entire phase, foreign policy of China

towards India and Pakistan was virtually unwavering in its hostility to India and its support for Pakistan. The uncertainty of Sino-Indian border increased the pressure upon India to negotiate with Pakistan over Kashmir's status, because the Chinese attack upon Ladakh (Eastern Kashmir) was a stark reminder that India's dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir could not be separated from the Indo-China boundary dispute. One of the India's most pressing security problems made obvious by the Sino-Indian war was that a considerable proportion of its troops were tied up in the defense of the India-Pakistan border, because of the tensions between the two over Kashmir (Denis Wright, 1989, 12). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited New York as the Foreign Minister of Pakistan where he met with Nehru and got appreciation for their policy of Non-Alignment. ZAB's foreign policy was inspired by Nehru, as both were heirs to substantial fortunes and paternal political wisdom (Wolpert, 1993).

The China and India conflict in 1962 has been observed by Ayub not only a chance for a brave parting from recognized policy but as a motive for firming it by inward at a disbursement with India. He gratified the Western authorities by authorizing India to pay its whole response to China. Negotiation was assumed not for becoming calm over Kashmir but to grant relief to India. Ayub Khan wrote in his personal diary, on Wednesday 26 of July 1968;

*I thanked Duncan Sandys (British politician and minister in conservative governments in the 1950s and 1960s) an MP, (Member of Parliament), for the trouble he had taken in 1962 to arrange a meeting between Nehru and me to settle the Kashmir Issue. He said that Americans sabotaged that meeting, Kennedy at Nassau (New York) and later, Grove would not see the logic of British pleading that there should be no arm delivery to India until Kashmir was settled, as how else could face India for China. Kennedy rejected this argument saying that their priorities were made up. China was on the top; they could not get involved in Kashmir. Also, his embassy in Delhi kept on telling him that no pressure should be brought to bear on Nehru at this stage as otherwise his government would collapse (Baxter, 2007, 244).*

According to the Foreign Minister Z.A Bhutto, if Ayub Khan didn't want to cause a slice while Indian government was being regimentally hassled by China, the minimum he did was to stay out of it rather than aiding India through covert and misleading tactics. As a result, Pakistan squandered a huge opportunity by making a mistake at the outset. So, if Kashmir is getting further away from a settlement, it's not because foreign policy has changed but because it hasn't changed at the precise time (Bhutto, 1995). In his speech on November, 1962, ZAB emphasized that foreign policy is not to treat with mobocracy neither it be applied for public yelling, the government should formulate its foreign policy for the immediate and continuing interests of the country (Bhutto, 1995).

The letter of Mr. Kennedy (U.S. President) to Ayub Khan on October 28, 1962, also indicated that U.S. assured Pakistan that the aid which had been given to India was mainly to counter Chinese incursion into the Indian territory and US did not allow Pakistan to wage a war against India in that crucial period. Moreover, Kennedy tried to get a message of assurance that Pakistan would not take any single action on the frontier to alarm India. Ayub Khan's answer was:

*I replied that the recent conflict between India and China has led to development of great concern to us. (khan, 2002).*

For the past ten years, the United States has provided Pakistan with generous economic aid. There were outright grants in the beginning. Loans, on the other hand,

gradually supplanted grants. Later on, economic help was only available in the form of interest-bearing credits. Pakistan was heavily burdened by a foreign debt that had risen to an alarming level of \$3,000 million. Ayub Khan couldn't understand why the US foreign policy had changed soon. He didn't understand Pakistan's relationship with the USSR either. Pakistan is vital to both the Middle East and South Asia from a strategic standpoint. As a neighbor to the north, the Soviet Union had been traditionally valued positive relations with Pakistan. These relations were strained not because of inherent reason but because of Pakistan's alignment with the West (Bhutto, 1995; Muzaffar, & Khan, 2021).

### **Kashmir Situation: Operation Grand Slam, Operation Gibraltar and Indo-Pak War 1965**

Post-1963, India tightened grip on occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Tensions escalated after the Hazratbal incident, where a sacred relic went missing. Muslims suspected Hindu involvement, attributing a motive to integrate the state into India's secular framework. This belief was reinforced by India's efforts before the incident to solidify the state's accession. Kashmir's Prime Minister announced changes aligning Kashmir with other Indian states, further fueling apprehensions (Gauhar, 1993). Nehru, Prime Minister of India forecast that the article 370 of the Indian constitution would go under gradual changes (Dawn, 29 November, 1963). And the initiative should come from the government of the state and the people of Kashmir. Pakistan strongly condemned the planned variations as unlawful and in barefaced damage to India's words (Dawn, 1 December, 1963).

On January 1964, ZAB, as a Foreign Minister, declared that the theft of artifact was overseen by the India ruling classes to reduce Muslim majority in J&K (Dawn, 2 January, 1964). The Kashmir Committee, under Maulana Syed Masoodi declared that the recovery of the artifact was supposed not to be recognized as honest till been scrutinized by the Board of Professionals. He demanded that all those imprisoned because of the theft of the relic should be released and judicial inquiry held into the incident. The situation got worse and state's relations with India intensified.

In December 27, 1962, ZAB and India's PM Swaran Singh held talks, but they yielded no outcomes, labeled "expectations without results" (Bhutto Swaran Singh Talks, 1962). Mediated by US and British diplomats on May 6, 1963, six rounds of ministerial-level discussions aimed at resolving the Kashmir issue were equally unfruitful due to persistent hostilities and differences. Bruce Riedel highlighted India's perceived Pak-China deal and internal Pakistani opposition as lessons from the talks (Riedel, 2015). Ayub Khan leaned toward negotiation, prioritizing Pakistan's stability. The theft of a sacred relic triggered unrest in Kashmir and Pakistan, while the government believed Kashmiris sought liberation with Pakistani support (Yusuf, 1994).

Nehru's death initiated change in Indo-Pak relations, breaking the Kashmir deadlock. Post-Nehru, conflicts arose along the Indo-Pak border, like the Rann of Kutch issue. On April 9, 1965, a confrontation ensued. Diplomatic exchanges led to the June 29, 1965, Rann of Kutch pact. India accused Pakistan of interference, Pakistan refuted claims, citing a disputed area and India's violations of 1960 ground rules (Wright, 1989).

The Pakistani Commandoes intervened into IOK across the Ceasefire Line and started their mission but the expected Kashmiri revolt was not materialized. The operation turned into a military disaster for Pakistan when India launched an unexpected counter-offensive along the ceasefire line successfully cutting off the infiltrators' supply lines (Rahila parveen, 2013, 269). Many Indian Generals including Harbaksh Singh described

Pakistan's military operation as "brilliant in conception" (Amin, 2000). However, it was overly ambitious in general and its accomplishment was beyond its means. K. C. Parval (Indian Military writer) also described the great deal of confusion which was created by "Gibraltar Forces" (Parval, 1987, 251). The "Operation Gibraltar" was failed in its objectives because the local population of Indian Occupied Kashmir was not taken into confidence before launching it, so they did not co-operate with the forces and handed over them to Indian army. Another reason was the presence in Kashmir valley of nearly five Indian infantry divisions and strong armed forces. Moreover the operation was launched in such a hasty manner that even the leaders of Pakistani Occupied Kashmir (POK) were not taken into consideration by the self-styled experts of guerilla raids. Supply of weapons, rations, medicines etc. to the disputed area were difficult to provide despite of the few areas replenished by air from west Pakistan through air drops carrying extremely dangerous flights mostly at night and in bad weather. However the "Nusrat Force" was successful in Tithwal area where it caused a great deal of damage with the help of locals (Amin, 2000).

This was the time when America was trying to develop its close relations with India and did not support Pakistan in the war as per expectations (Lerski, 1968, 401). The US-Pak relations were not good at that time, one of the reason was the neutrality of US in the war of 1965 despite of the defense pacts SEATO and CENTO. The other reason was the growing Sino-Pak relations (due to China's assistance to Pakistan during the war of 1965) which were criticized by US president John F. Kennedy. The attitude of USSR was remarkably different. It adopted a neutral posture and offered itself as mediator. Together India as well as Pakistan appreciatively recognized that agreement forwarded by USSR in the Security Council calling for a cease-fire. Ayub mentioned in his diary on October 1966 that Kosygin told me that it would be wonderful if USSR, India as well as Pakistan got together. The combination of some 800 million people would be formidable and also Ayub claimed that he was aware of their growing interest in the sub-continent. The Soviet Premier Kosygin was also able to persuade the both sides to see at Tashkent to sort out their issues. Both settled to remove their forces to the previous locations before the eruption of conflicts. But the Tashkent treaty (1966) as well the war itself did not do anything to break the deadlock. India had carried thorough tactics to restore relationships, it proposed no-war pact, rebuilding of relationships between both states, the recommencement of embassy relationships, freezing the ceasefire line into global border, the relief of detainees of warfare, repair of communicé and end of antagonistic misinformation.

But on the vital query of Kashmir, India asserted on the status quo while arguing that was an essential part of India and hence not discussable. And for Pakistan Kashmir was at the central of fight and all else was outlying. Both sides returned home disappointed. Ayub Khan wrote in his diary in December 1966, "On Kashmir, the Indians have gone back on their designs as expressed by Swaran Singh (Foreign Minister and member of India's UN delegation) to our Foreign Minister ZAB at the United Nations to discuss Kashmir meaningfully. That is the trouble with the Indians that they lack integrity and scruples and indulge in duplicity and deceit" (Lerski, 1968). The "Tashkent Agreement" (1966) contributed not more than to end exposed aggression which neither republic could pay for to stay (Lerski, 1968). The rise of ZAB as a popular leader and the downfall of Ayub Khan was inextricably linked with this agreement.

### **Pakistan Foreign Policy and Kashmir: An Appraisal**

Between 1962 and 1964, relations between India and Pakistan maintained something of static quality overall although, they were influenced by a number of

variables. The symbol of that unchanged attitude was Kashmir. The variables tended to be provided by the super-power maneuverings on the sub-continent, particularly in their relationship with China. Throughout the entire period, the foreign policy of China was tilted towards Pakistan and it supported Pakistan morally, economically and militarily. The Soviet and American interests were just because of their Cold War operations in this region and the second to the lateral cold war, which continued undebated in the 1960s (Wright, 1989).

The context of Indo-Pak relations virtually eliminated the hope of a Kashmir Settlement by other than military means. The fundamental propositions of both sides made diplomacy on Kashmir an extremely difficult task. India was reasonably satisfied on the status quo while Pakistan was not, then it was Pakistan which had to initiate the armed struggle. Since 1962, every step which India took to bind Kashmir tighter to itself through constitutional adjustments rendered more and more unlikely the operation of a plebiscite in the state. It was constantly and publically reiterated by the members of Indian government that Kashmir was not negotiable, which even led to the war of 1965.

It is unlikely that, even the Kashmir issue had been solved; India and Pakistan would have been able to maintain a friendly relationship. It was not that India and Pakistan had no capacity for fruitful negotiations because several important disputes like the Indus Water dispute had been peacefully resolved (Khan, et. al. 2022). Their profound political and philosophical differences remained a hurdle to settle Kashmir issue (Wright, 1989). Although in 1965, Bhutto displayed his fueled anger with extraordinary display of confidence in the United Nations Council while highlighting the issue of Kashmir. He read the Presidential message of Ayub Khan and then continued that termination of aggressions is not sufficient. The UN should then talk itself to the core issue. For almost 18 years, it played with the prospect of Kashmiris. It cannot make further a puppet out of five million public. He further reminded that Security Council of UN called it a lifeless and inactive matter but it cannot be a lifeless and dormant matter. While denying the right of self-determination of Kashmiris, India is pleading the excuse that they have been structuring multiethnic and multi-religious social orders and if they allow self-rule to one party, the state government may crumble. In this way India is exploiting the fear of dismemberment among many sovereign states. ZAB's speech was significant in Pakistani history because it led to the agreement which is known as "Tashkent Agreement" between Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan, all under Russian President Kosygin's watchful eye (Hameed, 2017).

The Indo-Pak war 1965 was led by the hostility and grievances against each other on each side and both of them perceived it as a real chance of victory. Pakistan nursed its desire over India's retention of Kashmir, while India saw Pakistan grow in military strength through the SEATO alliance. The war itself solved nothing in term of India-Pakistan relations. The stalemate which resulted enabled the Soviet Union to maneuver the sub-continental power balance into an even more frustrating stalemate, which was resolved only when Pakistan was torn apart in 1971. But within defined limits, the stalemate still remained as long as no decisive event solved the problem of Kashmir and the related political problems which brought about the dispute.

The Kashmir issue refers to the regional clash over the area, the North Western most of the area of the subcontinent. The accused of the disputes are Indian government, Pakistani government and Chinese government as well as the people of Kashmir area. Indian government is claiming whole previous Dogra area of Kashmir besides currently runs almost 43% of area counting most of Kashmir Valley, Laddakh and Siachin Glaciers.

Pakistan, which has approximately 37 percent of the total area of Kashmir, primarily Pakistani Occupied Kashmir and parts of Gilgit and Baltistan, questions India's claim. China controls nearly 20% of Kashmir, including Aksai Chin seized during the Sino-India conflict and the Trans-Karakorum zone known as Shaksgam Valley which Pakistan surrendered to it in 1963. India considers Kashmir a test case for its integrity and secularism, and it fears it would provide a reason to other separatist movements to demand secession based on ethnic, linguistic and religious lines (Masood & Muzaffar, 2019).

The Sino-Indian accord of 1962 has been observed by Ayub Khan not only a chance for a daring exit from established policy but a reason for consolidating it by new settlement with India. The intervention of the USSR, the US and China pushed and pulled the disputants in different directions. But within defined limits, the stalemate still remained as long as no decisive event solved the problem of Kashmir and the related political problems which brought about that dispute. In 1969 the relations between India and Pakistan and the major powers were the same as it had been in 1962. The Sino-Pak relations did not alter appreciably and the warming Sino-US relationship facilitated the establishment once again for a better relationship between Pakistan and the US. While Between India and Pakistan, same suspicion, war of propaganda and hostility continued over Kashmir. And both remained the virtual prisoners of their past. Their attitudes towards each other were so deeply ingrained that neither side was in a position to act in the best interests of the peoples of the subcontinent as a whole.



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